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Abstract
Israel was spared the worst of the world financial crisis of
2008-2009. However, austerity concerns are by no means
invisible in the developments in the field of civil procedure.
These concerns correlate heavily with the long-standing
Israeli preoccupation with ‘speeding up’ justice. An array of
simplified procedural tracks, aimed at addressing the per-
ceived inadequacy of ‘standard’ procedure, have been
developed in Israel over the years. The importance of simpli-
fied procedures in the Israeli system cannot be overestima-
ted. Their development illustrates the dialectical tension
between the values of ‘efficiency’ and ‘quality’ in the
administration of justice. During periods of austerity, the
scales are easily (or easier) tipped in favour of efficiency and
general or particular simplification of procedure. In times of
prosperity, on the other hand, concerns over ‘quality’,
access to justice, and truth discovery predominate, and
attempts at promoting efficiency and/or simplification at
their expense tend to be bogged down. Such attempts also
tend to lose their extrinsic legitimacy and are widely viewed
as ‘cutting corners’. This is evident in the recent Israeli expe-
rience with civil procedure reform.
Keywords: Israel, austerity, civil procedure, simplified proce-
dures, small claims
1 Introduction
‘Austerity seems to loom over everything nowadays, and
procedure is not exempt.’1 So mused – rather wistfully
– Richard Marcus in a 2013 article, while at the same
time remarking that ‘invoking a general fiscal crisis as a
reason for making big changes in procedure seems far
fetched’, as ‘[t]he welfare state is not usually thought to
include civil litigation or the way it is handled by the
courts’.2 The apparent contradiction contained in these
assessments has been recently resolved, in a symbolic
and resounding manner, in the Euro Summit statement
on the Greece bailout. The statement listed, among oth-
er preconditions for continued financial support, ‘the
* Ehud Brosh, LL.M., is a research student at the Hebrew University of
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1. R. Marcus, ‘Procedure in a Time of Austerity’, 3 International Journal of
Procedural Law 133, at 157 (2013).
2. Id., at 137.
adoption [by Greece] of the Code of Civil Procedure,
which is a major overhaul of procedures and arrange-
ments for the civil justice system and can significantly
accelerate the judicial process and reduce costs’.3 There
can, thus, be no more doubt (if there ever was any) that
austerity does ‘connect meaningfully to procedure’.4
Israel stands apart from most OECD member countries
in that it emerged from the global financial crisis with
its attendant recession, which started in 2007 and still
continues to be felt in large parts of Europe, virtually
unscathed5 (although signs of an economic slowdown
have appeared in 2015).6 And yet austerity concerns (in
a broader sense) are by no means irrelevant to Israeli
civil procedure.7 Indeed, the opposite is true: these con-
cerns, specifically manifested in the incessant preoccu-
3. Euro Summit Statement, Brussels, 12 July 2015, SN 4070/15, full text
available at: <www. consilium. europa. eu/ en/ press/ press -releases/ 2015/
07/ 12 -euro -summit -statement -greece/>. On the proposed new code,
which encountered significant opposition from both the lawyers’ and
the judges’ unions, see N. Kanellopoulos, ‘Civil Procedure Reform in
Greece’, Ekathimerini, 16 March 2014, available at: <www.
ekathimerini. com/ 158631/ article/ ekathimerini/ comment/ civil -procedure
-reform -in -greece>; D. Goulas, ‘Greek Lawyers on Strike for 13 Days to
Protest Against a Draft Bill Amending the Civil Procedure Code’, 27
November 2014, available at: <www. altalex. eu/ content/ greek -lawyers -
strike -13 -days -protest -against -draft -bill -amending -civil -procedure -
code>.
4. See Marcus, above n. 1, at 137. See also F. van Dijk and H. Dumbrava,
‘Judiciary in Times of Scarcity: Retrenchment and Reform’, 5(1) Interna-
tional Journal for Court Administration 1 (2013).
5. See P. Rivlin, The Israeli Economy from the Foundation of the State
Through the 21st Century (2011), at 115-6; D. Rosenberg, ‘The Israeli
Economy: After the Financial Crisis, New Challenges’, 14(1) Middle East
Review of International Affairs (2010), available at: <www. gloria -
center. org/ 2010/ 03/ rosenberg -2010 -03 -06/>; J. Braude and N. Sus-
smann, ‘Politique monétaire non conventionnelle: l’expérience israéli-
enne’, 113 Revue d’économie financière 103, at 104, 106 (2014). Isra-
el’s economy has exhibited steady above-average growth ever since;
see OECD, OECD Economic Surveys: Israel 2013 (2013), at 6, 12.
6. T. Yahav and N. Zomer, ‘Israel’s Economic Growth Slowing Dramatically
in 2015’ (17 August 2015), available at: <www. ynetnews. com/ articles/
0,7340,L -4691570,00. html>. This slowdown does not appear to be a
precursor of a full-scale recession in the short term, however. According
to an October 2015 estimate by Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics,
Israel’s GDP growth rate for that year will be 2.5%, only slightly below
the 2014 rate of 2.6%. See N. Neumann, ‘Ha-Lama’s: Ha-Meshek Yits-
mah ha-Shana be-2.5% Bilvad’ [‘CBI: The Economy Will Grow This
Year by Just 2.5%’], Globes, 18 October 2015, available at: <www.
globes. co. il/ news/ article. aspx ?did= 1001074303> (in Hebrew).
7. On austerity’s broad appeal, see N. Jabko, ‘The Political Appeal of Aus-
terity’, 11 Comparative European Politics 705 (2013). The Israeli eco-
nomic policy has been more or less constantly guided by fiscal restraint
since the end of hyperinflation in 1985 and in an even more pro-
nounced manner since 1996. See B.-Z. Zilberfarb, ‘From Boom to Bust:
The Israeli Economy 1990-2003’, 12 Israel Affairs 221, at 225 (2006);
Rivlin, above n. 5, at 78-84.
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pation with ensuring ‘speedier’ and more cost-effective
justice, have been a fixture – at times in the background,
at times in the forefront – of the debate over the devel-
opments in the field since the 1970s. It is especially so
since the beginning of this millennium, and for good
reason: in the years 2001-2003 Israel experienced a peri-
od of serious economic difficulties, entailing drastic aus-
terity measures.8 As will be shown, it is during this
recessionary spell that some important reforms aimed at
streamlining the civil justice system and saving costs
were introduced. Importantly, the reforms concerned
themselves not only with the general procedures appli-
cable in civil cases but also, to a large extent, with vari-
ous simplified alternatives to ‘standard’ procedure:
either by upgrading the existing alternatives or by creat-
ing new ones. However, the trend manifested in broad-
ening the scope of simplified procedures has also
encountered considerable criticism which may affect the
prospect of further reforms in the future. The debate
has been reinvigorated lately by the proposed general
overhaul of civil procedure, put forward by the Israeli
Justice Ministry in December 2014, which is discussed
below.
The aim of this article is to give an overview of the Isra-
eli experience with simplified modes of civil procedure,
while highlighting their role in the attempts to increase
the efficiency of the justice system, as well as the influ-
ence of austerity factors on their development. Can Isra-
el actually be seen as (almost) a poster case of such an
influence? The article proceeds as follows: Section 2
starts with a brief sketch of the Israeli legal system in
general and of the civil procedure in particular. A pre-
sentation of some salient features of civil litigation in
Israel, such as the caseload burden, representation,
costs, and legal aid, is also provided. Section 3 then dis-
cusses in detail, and in comparative perspective, the var-
ious simplified procedures available in Israel – with spe-
cial attention being paid to rationales for each of them –
such as Small Claims Courts, summary, and fast track
procedure. Section 4 touches on the dilemma inherent
in (but by no means limited to) broadening the scope of
simplified procedures, especially in the context of aus-
terity – between a deep dissatisfaction with ‘slow’ and
unreasonably expensive justice on the one hand and
concern over the effects of ‘cutting procedural corners’
on the overall quality of justice. This dialectical contra-
diction is at the core of the current debate in Israel over
the merits and demerits of continued simplification of
civil procedure, recently rekindled by the Justice Minis-
try’s sweeping reform proposal. Some conclusions are
briefly summed up in Section 5.
8. See Zilberfarb, above n. 7, at 227-31. This recession, mainly caused by
worldwide collapse in the high-tech-industry (the ‘dot-com crash’) coin-
cided with – and was exacerbated by – a protracted round of large-
scale Israeli-Palestinian violence known as the ‘Second Intifada’.
2 Legal and Institutional
Background
2.1 Civil Procedure in Israel – Sources and
Trends
The Israeli legal system, which is based on a wide array
of sources, historically rooted in and continuously influ-
enced by elements of both civil and common, as well as
religious law,9 is best characterised as ‘mixed’10 or
‘hybrid’.11 It can also be generally described as pluralis-
tic and multicultural,12 as well as highly dynamic.13 The
system’s mixed nature comes to the fore in two partly
conflicting trends dominating the historical develop-
ment of Israeli law: that of codification on the one
hand,14 and that of judicial ‘hyper-activism’,15 carried
by a predominantly ‘common lawish’ jurisprudence,16
on the other. Another underlying jurisprudential trend
in Israel since the 1980s – and especially so after the
constitutionalisation of human rights commonly refer-
red to as Israel’s ‘constitutional revolution’17 – has been
the gradual rise of (substantive) values and the decline
of (formal) rules.18
Civil procedure is one of the fields of Israeli law where
the British roots run deepest. In fact, the current Israeli
9. See generally A.E. Platsas, ‘The Enigmatic but Unique Nature of the
Israeli Legal System’, 15(3) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 11
(2012). On the cultural struggles over the shaping of Israeli law, and
especially over the place of Jewish law within the legal system, see M.
Mautner, Law and the Culture of Israel (2011), at 31-53.
10. A. Barak, ‘Shitat ha-Mishpat ha-Yisra’elit – Masorta u-Tarbuta’ [‘The
Israeli Legal System – Its Tradition and Culture’], 40 Ha-Praklit 197, at
209 (1992) (in Hebrew); A. Barak, ‘Some Reflections on the Israeli Legal
System and Its Judiciary’, 6.1 Electronic Journal of Comparative Law
Part 3 (2002), available at: <www. ejcl. org/ 61/ art61 -1. html>.
11. Platsas, above n. 9, at 15.
12. Id., at 14.
13. Id., at 29 (‘The Israeli legal system is a system characterised by legal
kinesis; it is not a system of legal stasis’).
14. Barak (2002), above n. 10, Part 3.
15. See generally Y. Dotan, ‘Judicial Accountability in Israel: The High Court
of Justice and the Phenomenon of Judicial Hyperactivism’, 8(4) Israel
Affairs 87 (2002); E. Salzberger, ‘Judicial Activism in Israel’, in B. Dick-
son (ed.), Judicial Activism in Common Law Supreme Courts (2007)
217.
16. Barak (2002), above n. 10, Part 3.
17. See e.g. D. Kretzmer, ‘New Basic Laws on Human Rights: A Mini-Revo-
lution in Israeli Constitutional Law?’ 26 Israel Law Review 238 (1992);
A. Barak, ‘A Constitutional Revolution: Israel’s Basic Laws’, 4 Constitu-
tional Forum 83 (1992-1993); G. Sapir, ‘Constitutional Revolutions:
Israel as a Case-Study’, 5 International Journal of Law in Context 355
(2009). The central development in this regard is the adoption in 1992
of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, SH No. 1391, at 150.
18. See Mautner, above n. 9, at 75-98; M. Mautner, ‘Yeridat ha-Formalizm
ve-Aliyat ha-Arakhim ba-Mishpat ha-Yisra’eli’ [‘The Decline of Formal-
ism and the Rise of Values in Israeli Law’], 17 Iyunei Mishpat 503
(1983) (in Hebrew). On the gradual introduction of ‘standards’ at the
expense of ‘rules’ into the Israeli civil procedure, see I. Rosen-Zvi, Ha-
Halikh ha-Ezrahi [The Civil Process] (2015), at 223-4 (in Hebrew).
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Rules of Civil Procedure, 1984 (hereinafter – RCP),19
are based on a verbatim translation of the (now defunct)
English Rules of the Supreme Court, first introduced to
the local law by the British Mandatory power in 1938,
and until lately only sparsely amended.20 Nevertheless,
despite its conservatism and traditionally highly formal
nature, Israel’s law of civil procedure has not remained
immune to the influences of both constitutionalisation21
and deformalisation, the last trend being in line with the
developments in other jurisdictions.22 Although the
Israeli jurisprudence generally views civil procedure as a
balancing instrument between two conflicting goals: sta-
bility and predictability – as embodied in black letter
procedural rules – vs. discovery of the truth in order to
assure justice between the litigants,23 there is a marked
lack of sympathy with procedural limitations on adjudi-
cating the merits of the case.24 The Israeli Supreme
Court – especially under the influence of über-activist
Justice Aharon Barak, who served as its member since
1978, and as the Court’s President between 1995 and
2006 – has exhibited concern that overemphasis on pro-
cedure might lead to ‘purely formal tactics’ adopted by
the parties, impairing the court’s (primary) mission of
truth discovery.25 This concern is an expression of the
general importance attributed by the Israeli law to the
right of access to courts.26 As a consequence, wide (and
seemingly ever-growing) discretion is given to the trial
19. Rules of Civil Procedure, 5744-1984, KT 4685, at 2220. The Rules are
issued by the Minister of Justice upon the authority delegated in Courts
Law (Consolidated Version), 5744-1984, 38 LSI 271 (1983-1984)
[hereinafter – Courts Law]. The Courts Law deals with issues such as
subject matter jurisdiction, composition of judges’ panels, transfer of tri-
als, and rights of appeal. See S. Goldstein et al., Civil Procedure in Israel
(2013), at 20.
20. See S. Goldstein, ‘Forty Years of Civil Procedure’, 24 Israel Law Review
789, at 789-90 (1990); Goldstein et al., above n. 19, at 19-20.
21. On the constitutional human rights influences on the Israeli civil proce-
dure law, see S. Levin, ‘Hok Yesod: Kvod ha-Adam ve-Heruto ve-Sidrei
ha-Din ha-Ezrahi’im’ [‘Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom and Civil
Procedure‘], 42 Ha-Praklit 451 (1995) (in Hebrew); D. Menashe, ‘Sed-
er-Din Ezrahi: Megamot Merkaziyot Likrat Kinuna shel Perspektiva
Hukatit’ [‘Civil Procedure: Principal Trends Towards the Establishment
of a Constitutional Perspective’], 22 Iyunei Mishpat 205 (1999) (in
Hebrew); D. Schwartz, Seder Din Ezrahi: Hidushim, Tahalikhim u-Meg-
amot [Civil Procedure: Innovations, Processes and Trends] (2007), at
36-8, 101-31 (in Hebrew).
22. On the deformalisation philosophy underlying the new French Code of
Civil Procedure, adopted in 1975, see L. Cadiet, ‘Introduction to French
Civil Justice System and Civil Procedural Law’, 28 Ritsumeikan Law
Review 331, at 367-73 (2011).
23. CA 447/92 Roth v. Intercontinental Credit Corporation, 49(2) PD 102,
at 115 (1995). For an overview of the aims of Israel’s civil procedure as
well as its underlying principles and values (such as discovery of truth,
effectiveness, certainty and predictability, finality, equality, even-hand-
edness and equality of the party, openness, autonomy, participation,
and rationality), see Rosen-Zvi, above n. 18, at 31-108.
24. See Goldstein et al., above n. 19, at 81.
25. CrimA 951/80 Kanir v. State of Israel, 35(3) PD 505, at 517 (1981) (per
Barak J.).
26. See HCJ 2171/06 Cohen v. Chairman of the Knesset, para. 19 (29
August 2011), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (per Beinisch
C.J.); Schwartz, above n. 21, at 105-15. On the right of access to justice
in Israel in general, and in the Israeli-Palestinian context in particular,
see M.M. Karayanni, ‘Access to Justice Ascends to International Civil
Litigation: The Case of Palestinian Plaintiffs before Israeli Courts’, 33
Civil Justice Quarterly 1 (2014).
judge to rectify procedural flaws.27 This, in turn,
reflects a gradual retreat from the adversarial system and
towards a more interventionist role of the judge.28 The
latter trend looks set to persist and to intensify, even as
the previously rather light-handed approach to proce-
dure seems to be shifting in recent years, under Barak’s
successors at the helm of the Supreme Court.29 The
shift is also prominent in the proposed draft of new
Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter – the Draft Rules
or the Draft), intended to replace the current RCP from
1984, which was recently released by the Israeli Minis-
try of Justice for public perusal and discussion,30 and is
examined below.31
2.2 Caseload Burden
The Israeli court system is notoriously overburdened. A
comparative study, commissioned by the Courts
Administration in 2007, found Israel is placed third in
terms of the caseload burden, out of seventeen countries
surveyed.32 The case backlog is also huge: according to
the official yearly report on the activity of the Israeli
judiciary, at the end of 2013 it stood at 440,850 cases.33
These data can easily explain the public dissatisfaction
with the protracted length of judicial proceedings in
Israel – exacerbated by a practice lacking continuous
and concentrated trial34 – which is generally perceived
as unjustified red tape. Some stark anecdotal evidence
exists as to how the judges themselves view the burden,
including resignations and, in one extreme case, even
suicide.35 Another telling, albeit indirect, indication of
the current backlog situation in Israel – (fairly) reassur-
27. Goldstein et al., above n. 19, at 96-7; U. Goren, Sugiyot be-Seder Din
Ezrahi [Issues in Civil Procedure], 11th edn. (2013), at 9-10 (in
Hebrew).
28. Schwartz, above n. 21, at 38-40; Goldstein et al., above n. 19, at 25.
For similar developments in French law, see Cadiet, above n. 22, at 349.
29. On the current Israeli trend towards the adoption of an ‘administrative’
(or ‘case management’) model of adjudication, see below, Section 4.
30. State of Israel, Ministry of Justice, Tyutat Takanot Seder ha-Din ha-
Ezrahi, 5775-2014 [Draft Rules of Civil Procedure, 5775-2014] (2014)
(in Hebrew), available at: <http:// index. justice. gov. il/ Pubilcations/
Articles/ Pages/ Memorandum1512. aspx>.
31. Section 4.2.
32. R. Sulitzeanu-Kenan, A. Reichman & E. Vigoda-Gadot, Ha-Omes al
Ma’arakhot Mishpat: Nitu’ah Hashva’ati shel 17 Medinot [The Case-
load Burden on Judiciary Systems: A Comparative analysis of 17 Coun-
tries] (2007), at 12-4, 38 (in Hebrew). The burden is calculated based
on the ratio between the number of cases and the number of professio-
nal judges. A slightly different methodology, taking into account lay
judges, raises Israel to the second place in the judicial burden rating. Id.
at 15-6.
33. State of Israel, Courts Administration, Ha-Reshut ha-Shofetet be-Yis-
ra’el: Du’a”h Shnati 2013 [The Judicial Authority in Israel: Yearly
Report 2013] (2014), at 9 (in Hebrew), available at: <http:// elyon1.
court. gov. il/ heb/ haba/ dochot/ doc/ shnati2013. pdf> [hereinafter –
Yearly Report 2013]. The overall number of new cases opened in 2013
was 724,345; 752,927 cases were closed during the same year. Id. at 9.
34. See Goldstein et al., above n. 19, at 25. The lack of continuous trial in
Israel represents a major difference between Israeli and English civil pro-
cedure and is rooted in the absence of juries in the Israeli court system.
Id.
35. See S. Shetreet, ‘Erkei ha-Yesod shel Ma’arekhet ha-Shfita be-Yisra’el’
[‘Basic Values of the Justice System in Israel’], in A. Barak, R. Sokol & O.
Shaham (eds.), Sefer Or: Kovets Ma’amarim Likhvod ha-Shofet Theo-
dor Or [Or Book: A Collection of Articles in Honor of Justice Theodor
Or] (2013) 617, at 625 (in Hebrew).
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ing official statistics notwithstanding36 – can be found in
the protracted legal battle waged by the Courts Admin-
istration against a freedom of information request by
Israel’s leading economic newspaper, which sought to
obtain data on the number of pending cases before each
individual District Judge and Supreme Court Justice,
and on the time that has elapsed since these cases were
filed.37 Attempts to address the problems of backlog and
‘slow justice’ over the last decade have been only partial-
ly successful.38
2.3 Representation, Costs, and Legal Aid
In Israel, parties in civil proceedings have a right to be
represented by an attorney of their choice (with one sig-
nificant exception, discussed below).39 No mandatory
representation by counsel is required, including before
the Supreme Court; practically, however, a layman
would lack the ability to represent himself/herself effec-
tively even in fairly simple civil cases.40 As representa-
tion is voluntary, attorney’s fees are a matter of private
agreement and generally not subject to judicial
control,41 though non-binding recommendations on the
minimum rates, issued by the Israel Bar Association,
exist.42 State-funded legal aid in civil proceedings is
regulated by special legislation.43 The criteria for eligi-
bility, based on income and assets, are rather restrictive,
largely limiting free legal aid to the poor,44 while special
statutory provisions, without a ‘means test’, are available
regarding national insurance benefit claims.45 The
Supreme Court has on occasion expressed concern over
the inadequacy of the existing system of legal aid and
pondered on the necessity of expanding it beyond the
existing statutory provisions.46 This inadequacy pres-
ents a serious access-to-justice problem, exacerbated by
36. According to data published by the Israeli Courts Administration, the
median lifespan of a civil case now stands at 13.8 months for the Mag-
istrates’ Courts (general courts of first instance with exclusive jurisdic-
tion of monetary claims of up to NIS 2,500,000 – c. EUR 600,000 at the
current exchange rate), and at 22.7 months for the District Courts (gen-
eral courts of residual jurisdictions); 4.7% of all cases before the District
Courts (over 2,000 in absolute terms) are 4 years and older. See Yearly
Report 2013, above n. 33, at 20, 23, 28.
37. See AdmA 3908/11 State of Israel – The Courts Administration v. The
Marker Newspaper (29 September 2014), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription). Due to its special public importance, the case was decided
by an enlarged panel of seven Supreme Court Justices. Even though the
Courts Administration lost, it was allowed a delay until the end of 2015
to prepare the data.
38. See below, Section 4.1.
39. See below, Section 3.1.
40. Cf. generally, R. Assy, ‘Revisiting the Right to Self-Representation in
Civil Proceedings’, 30 Civil Justice Quarterly 267 (2011).
41. See Goldstein et al., above n. 19, at 172.
42. Bar Association Rules (Recommended Minimum Fee), 5760-2000, YP
4852, at 2558. On the non-binding nature of these Rules, see Goren,
above n. 27, at 724.
43. Legal Aid Law, 5732-1972, 26 LSI 115 (1971-1972); Legal Aid Regula-
tions, 5733-1973, KT 3062, at 2048.
44. Goldstein et al., above n. 19, at 171.
45. These include claims for old-age, disability and survivors’ pensions,
maternity benefits and child allowances, unemployment compensation
etc. See National Insurance Regulations (Legal Aid), 5738-1978, KT
3895, at 2170.
high costs of legal representation47 and elevated court
filing fees.48
A special chapter in the Israeli RCP is devoted to the
issue of trial costs.49 The fundamental provision, con-
tained in Rule 511, does not enunciate any general prin-
ciple imposing the costs on the losing party, but rather
grants the court sweeping discretion with regard to both
the allocation and the amount of costs, with only a few
rather vague guidelines.50 Thus, in practice, cost awards
routinely under-compensate the actual expenditures
incurred during the trial,51 while in a considerable per-
centage of cases, the losing party is totally exempted
from bearing the winner’s costs.52 This situation has
evoked much criticism.53 Lately, the Israeli Supreme
46. See LCA 6810/97 Ben Shoshan v. Ben Shoshan, 51(5) PD 375, at
378-9 (1997) (per J. Türkel J.); Levin, above n. 21, at 458. The Court
also recognises that difficulties in obtaining state-funded legal aid con-
stitute a ‘special reason’ justifying an extension of procedural time limits
for the relevant party; see HCJ 1986/06 Plonit (Jane Doe) v. High Rab-
binical Court, para. 13 (27 May 2008), Nevo Legal Database (by sub-
scription) (per E. Arbel J.); LCA 9382/10 Ploni (John Doe) v. Attorney-
General, para. 6 (19 July 2011), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription)
(per N. Hendel J.).
47. A question could be raised about the possible effect of the ‘flooding’ of
the legal profession in Israel over the last years on attorneys’ fees. Israel
now has probably the highest per capita ratio of lawyers among devel-
oped countries; see N. Ziv, ‘Unauthorized Practice of Law and the Pro-
duction of Lawyers in Israel’, 19 International Journal of Legal Profes-
sion, 175, at 176-8 (2012). Hope has been expressed in the literature
that these developments, as well as the proliferation of pro bono serv-
ices provided by various NGOs, legal clinics, and such might cause the
fees to go down in the near future. See T. Fisher and I. Rosen-Zvi, ‘It’s
for the Judges to Decide: Allocation of Trial Costs in Israel’, in M. Reim-
ann (ed.), Cost and Fee Allocation in Civil Procedure: A Comparative
Study (2011) 177, at 184. This hope seems over-optimistic, as the over-
production of lawyers in Israel is by no means a recent phenomenon,
yet has so far failed to have a noticeable influence on the pricing of
legal services (as opposed to their quality, which has generally
declined).
48. In monetary claims, the basic fee is set at 2.5% of the amount claimed,
of which half is payable upon the filing of the claim and the second half
20 days before the first evidentiary hearing. A different, low fee system
exists for non-monetary claims and claims viewed as ‘not capable of
monetary expression’ (such as declaratory judgments, injunctions, spe-
cific performance, and ejectment actions.). The obvious result of such a
system is that litigants go to great lengths to frame actions as non-mon-
etary. See generally, Court Regulations (Filing Fees), 5767-2007, KT
6579, at 720; Goldstein et al., above n. 19, at 172-4.
49. RCP Chapter 34, Rules 511-519.
50. Fisher and Rosen-Zvi, above n. 47, at 177-8. According to RCP Rule
512(2), the court’s decision on costs should take into account, ‘among
other considerations’ (unspecified), the amount or value of the relief
sought by the plaintiff and the value actually granted by the court, as
well as the manner in which the parties conducted the trial.
51. Id, at 180; Goldstein et al., above n. 19, at 172.
52. For an overview and critical analysis of the Israeli practice in this regard,
see T. Eisenberg, T. Fisher & I. Rosen-Zvi, ‘Attorney Fees in a Loser Pays
System’, 162 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1619 (2014).
According to the authors, litigation costs are denied to prevailing plain-
tiffs in 26%, and to prevailing defendants in 29% of all cases, with con-
siderable fluctuations between different types of proceedings; Id., at
1640-1645.
53. See e.g. Levin, above n. 21, at 457-8. It should be noted, however, that
the verdict of the law and economics literature on the social desirability
of (full) fee-shifting, as opposed to the prevailing American rule, under
which each party bears its litigation costs, is inconclusive. See generally,
e.g. S. Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law (2004), at
432; D.P. Kessler and D.L. Rubinfeld, ‘Empirical Study of the Civil Litiga-
tion System’, in A.M. Polinsky and S. Shavell (eds.), Handbook of Law
and Economics (2007) 343, at 373-4.
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Court seems to have moved toward favouring full(er)
compensation of actual costs, as long as they are ‘reason-
able, necessary, and proportional’.54 Nonetheless, the
principle of awarding actual costs is a mere presump-
tion, fairly easily overridden by policy considerations
such as avoiding over-deterrence, preventing inequality
between rich and poor parties, constraining the costs of
litigation, and assuring access to justice.55 Ultimately,
even under the new approach the actual expenditures of
the winning party are but one factor (albeit an important
one) considered by the court in its decision on whether
to award trial costs at all, and on their amount.56 The
proposed reform of the Israeli civil procedure, discussed
below, does not seem to introduce far-reaching changes
into the prevailing system of cost compensation.57
3 Available Simplified
Procedures
3.1 Small Claims Courts
Special provisions for dealing with small claims (cur-
rently – monetary claims for up to NIS 33,800) were
enacted in Israel in 1976, establishing Small Claims
54. See HCJ 891/05 Tnuva Cooperative Center for Marketing of Agricul-
tural Produce in Israel Ltd. v. Import Licensing Authority, paras. 19,
23-24 (30 June 2005), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription). In this
decision, the Supreme Court Registrar, Judge Y. Mersel, posited that the
actual expenses incurred by the winning party should serve as a base-
line for awarding costs; once these expenses have been proven suffi-
ciently (e.g. by presenting the retainer agreement and additional evi-
dence pertaining to the work performed, and payments made), the bur-
den of proof would shift to the party claiming that the costs were
unreasonable or unnecessary. Id. para. 25. The decision’s tenor has
been adopted as part of administrative guidelines issued by the Chief
Justice (President) of the Supreme Court. See Eisenberg, Fisher &
Rosen-Zvi, above n. 52, at 1633 n. 64.
55. LCA 6793/08 La’or Ltd. v. Meshulam Levinstein Engineering and Con-
tracting Ltd., para. 19 (28 June 2009), Nevo Legal Database (by sub-
scription) (per H. Melcer J.).
56. See 9535/04 ‘Bialik 10’ Faction v. ‘Yesh Atid le-Bialik’ Faction, 60(1)
PD 391, at 395 (2005) (per A. Grunis J.). The effectiveness of the
‘actual costs’ principle is further undermined by the fact that parties
rarely introduce evidence as to the amounts actually expended in the
litigation; see Fisher and Rosen-Zvi, above n. 47, at 179.
57. See generally A. Klement, ‘Reforma be-Hotsa’ot Mishpat ba-Halikh ha-
Ezrakhi – Mitve le-Diyun’ [‘Reform of Legal Costs in Civil Proceedings –
A Discussion Framework’], paper presented at the Faculty of Law, Tel
Aviv University, March 2015 (on file with the author) (in Hebrew).
Courts.58 These do not constitute a totally separate
jurisdictional body but rather a division of the Magis-
trates’ Courts.59 Thus, small claims jurisdiction is not
exclusive but concurrent; whenever it applies, the plain-
tiff has a free choice between actually filing a claim in a
Small Claims Court or in a ‘regular’ Magistrates’
Court.60 If the Small Claims Court finds the claim
‘unsuitable’ for adjudication before it, it has discretion
to transfer the claim to the Magistrates’ Court.61
The declared aim of the creation of Small Claims Courts
was to provide an ‘informal, prompt, and cheap’ proce-
dure for the benefit of the ‘small citizen’ who might be
deterred from bringing his/her claims before a regular
court due to high costs and long delays.62 The addition-
al, if undeclared, purpose seems to be alleviating the
caseload burden of Magistrates’ Courts. Statutory pro-
visions on small claims procedure reflect the above
rationales. The filing fee for proceedings before a Small
Claims Court is fixed at just 1% of the value of the
claim (as opposed to 2.5% in regular courts).63 Proceed-
ings are initiated by a complaint (statement of claim)
that should conform to a simplified form.64 Small
Claims Courts are not bound by rules of procedure
applying to other courts.65 They are also entitled to
accept evidence which would be inadmissible under
general rules.66 In case of lack of reply or non-appear-
ance by the defendant, the court shall give judgment
solely on the basis of the complaint, subject to the
claimant’s declaring the veracity of the claims contained
58. Goldstein et al., above n. 19, at 34; Goren, above n. 27, at 1303. The
provisions on Small Claims Courts are now incorporated in Chapter B,
Part E, of the Courts Law. NIS 33,800 equals approx. EUR 8,000 at the
current exchange rate. This sum is adjusted yearly for inflation. See
Courts Law, Section 60(a)(1). For comparable jurisdictional limits in
countries without a jurisdiction specifically designed to adjudicate small
monetary claims, see e.g. in Germany: Local Court (Amtsgericht), Ger-
ichtsverfassungsgesetz (GVG) § 23 (competence in disputes concerning
claims involving an amount or with a monetary value not exceeding
EUR 5,000); in France: Court of First Instance (tribunal d’instance),
Code de l’organisation judiciare, Art. L221-4 (claims with a value of up
to EUR 10,000), and Proximity Court (jurisdiction de proximité) – Art.
L231-3 of the same Code (claims of up to EUR 4,000). In England, the
upper limit of the small claims jurisdiction was recently raised from GBP
5,000 to GBP 10,000. See N. Andrews, 1 Andrews on Civil Processes
(2013), at 94.
59. Magistrates’ Courts are the lowest tier of the general court system in
Israel, with competence over matters not falling into the jurisdiction of
District Courts. See above n. 35.
60. Goldstein et al., above n. 19, at 52.
61. Courts Law, Section 60(b). The same discretion applies if the claim was
filed by a plaintiff who has filed more than five claims during the same
year in the same court.
62. See LCA 292/93 Sarbuz v. O. Ofek Ltd., 48(3) PD 177, at 189-90
(1994); Rosen-Zvi, above note 18, at 154. See also above notes 47-48,
and the accompanying text. For an almost literally identical statement
of purpose of small claims courts in New York, see J.J. Markwardt, ‘The
Nature and Operation of the New York Small Claims Courts’, 38 Albany
Law Review 196, 196 (1974).
63. Small Claims Jurisdiction Regulations, 5737-1976, Section 6(a), KT
3633, at 510 [hereinafter – Small Claims Jurisdiction Regulations]. See
also above n. 47.
64. Small Claims Jurisdiction Regulations, Section 3, form 1.
65. Courts Law, Section 62(b).
66. Id., Section 62(A). See also Sarbuz, 48(3) PD, at 190; Goren, above n.
27, at 1304.
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therein;67 this amounts to a significant alleviation of the
habitual burden of proof in civil cases and a deviation
from general rules on default judgments.68 The court
shall give its judgment at the end of the hearing, and in
any case no later than 7 days thereafter; the judgment
shall be ‘succinctly reasoned’.69
The advantages (mostly for the claimant) inherent in the
small claims procedure do not, however, come without a
price. In order to ensure informal and prompt justice at
a low cost, the Israeli legislator imposed two major con-
straints on the parties appearing before the Small
Claims Court. First, there is no representation by attor-
ney, except by permission from the court and for special
reasons that shall be recorded.70 This provision was
introduced at the insistence of consumer advocates in
order to ‘even up the field’ between small claimants and
large commercial entities;71 yet its positive effects on
consumers are questionable.72 The second limitation
concerns the right of appeal: from Small Claims Courts
there is no appeal as of right but rather by leave of the
appellate court.73 Leave for appeal can be given against
final judgments only, while ‘other decisions’ of Small
Claims Courts, such as interlocutory orders, are not
appealable at all.74 The time limit for requesting a leave
for appeal in small claims proceedings is 15 days, as
opposed to 30 days in proceedings before a regular
court.75 Constitutional doubts arising out of lack of
67. Small Claims Jurisdiction Regulations, Section 10-11.
68. See LCA 8821/09 Pruzhansky v. Laila Tov Hafakot Co., paras. 10-11
(16 November 2011), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (per Y.
Danziger J.). However, these provisions do not absolve the court from
the duty to establish whether the facts stated in the complaint prima
facie establish a valid claim. Id., para. 12.
69. Small Claims Jurisdiction Regulations, Section 15.
70. Courts Law, Section 63(a). See also S. Becher and A. Klein, ‘Paradoks
ha-Yitzug ve-ha-Ko’ah be-Beit ha-Mishpat le-Tvi’ot Ktanot?’ [‘Paradox
of Representation and Power in the Small Claims Court?’], 50 Ha-Pra-
klit 327, 336-7 (2010) (in Hebrew); Goren, above n. 27, at 1304-1305.
71. See LCA 6892/13 Haymovich v. Ohayon, para. 11 (23 February 2014),
Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (per E. Rubinstein J.) (the aim of
the ‘non-representation’ provision is to ‘preserve equality and symmetry
between the parties in the Small Claims Court and prevent a situation in
which the preponderant power of one side creates an asymmetry in
representation’).
72. Goldstein et al., above n. 19, at 29-30. The consumer rationale of the
‘non-representation’ rule can also be circumvented – or even eviscer-
ated – by ‘repeat players’, such as insurance companies, with negative
consequences for all parties. See Becher and Klein, above n. 70, at
345-84; on the distinction between ‘repeat players’ and ‘one-shotters’
in litigation see the seminal article by M. Galanter, ‘Why The “Haves”
Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change’, 9 Law
& Society Review 95 (1974). Recently, Supreme Court Justice Rubin-
stein subjected this practice to scathing critique, emphasising that
Courts Law, at Section 62(B), specifically prohibits the use of ‘professio-
nal representatives’ by corporate parties in Small Claims Courts, while
representation by a ‘case worker’ is acceptable; see LCA 6892/13 Hay-
movich, paras. 12-14. What influence this decision will have on future
litigation practice remains to be seen.
73. Courts Law, at Section 64.
74. See Sarbuz, 48(3) PD, at 191, 200; Goren, above n. 27, at 1307. On
the distinction between ‘judgments’ and ‘other decisions’ in Israeli civil
procedure in the context of appeal rights, see Goldstein et al., above n.
19, at 34-5.
75. Small Claims Jurisdiction Regulations, at Section 16(a); Goren, above n.
27, at 1305, 1308.
appeal as of right from Small Claims Courts76 have been
dismissed by the Supreme Court.77 Furthermore, the
jurisprudence has developed a strikingly parsimonious
attitude towards the grounds justifying granting leave
for appeal.78 Leave will not be granted unless there is an
obvious mistake of fact or law on the part of the Small
Claims Court – a mistake which can be established with-
out requiring extended discussion or preliminary plead-
ings.79 The mere fact that the court’s decision raises a
question of legal or public importance on which no clear
case law exists does not itself justify granting leave for
appeal, as small claims procedure is not considered suit-
able for the development of legal doctrine. Rather, leave
should be granted only if the relevant question is of the
kind frequently addressed by Small Claims Courts, in
order not to perpetuate a mistaken judgement which
might serve as precedent to the court which gave it.80
The Small Claims Court as an institution has proven to
be a resounding success in Israel. Over time, it has
developed into a veritable consumer affairs court and
acquired a central position in the Israeli system of con-
sumer protection.81 In 2013, over 14% of all actions in
Magistrates’ Courts were filed under the small claims
track, highlighting its indispensability.82 One indication
of the Small Claims Court’s wide popularity is its juris-
dictional limit being raised over the years far beyond the
inflation rate; so, in 2008 the maximum monetary
amount within the court’s jurisdiction was almost dou-
bled.83 This increase was wholeheartedly supported by
Israel’s chief consumer protection organisation.84 The
prevailing consensus in Israel is that the institutional
and procedural design of the Small Claims Court, which
guarantees important advantages to litigants who are
76. See Goldstein et al., above n. 19, at 34; minority opinion of S. Levin J.
in Sarbuz, 48(3) PD, at 184-5.
77. Sarbuz, 48(3) PD, at 193-4, 196 (per D. Levin J.).
78. See generally, Goren, above n. 27, at 1308.
79. LA (Jer’) 244/90 Ya’ir v. Frenkel, PM 5751(3) 309, 314 (1991); LSC
(Hi’) 45991-02-14 Tzadok v. Pelephone Communications Ltd., para. 24
(25 August 2014), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription).
80. See Ya’ir, PM 5751(3), at 315; LA (Jer’) 375/08 Arkia Israel Airlines v.
Korakh, para. 10 (3 April 2008), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription);
LCA 2095/15 Neptune Halls Bat-Yam Ltd. v. Mashiah, para. 4 (20 May
2015), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (per Z. Zilbertal J.). The
proper way for a Small Claims Court judge confronted with a new and
important legal question would be to transfer the case to the Magis-
trates’ Court, in accordance with Courts Law, at Section 60(b). See LA
(Jer’) 375/08 Arkia Israel Airlines, para. 10.
81. See Sinai Deutch, ‘Beit ha-Mishpat le-Tvi’ot Ktanot ke-Magen ha-Tsar-
khan’ [‘The Small Claims Court as Protector of the Consumer’], 8 Iyunei
Mishpat 345 (1981) (in Hebrew); Becher and Klein, above n. 70, at 334
n. 28.
82. Yearly Report 2013, above n. 33, at 26.
83. Courts Order (Change of Claim Amount in Small Claims), 5768-2008,
KT No. 6702, at 1228. See also Becher and Klein, above n. 70, at 334
n. 29.
84. As expressed during the Knesset debate by Adv. Yael Cohen-Shawat,
Legal Adviser to the Israel Consumer Council. See The Knesset, Consti-
tution, Law and Justice Committee, Protocol no. 598 (7 July 2008),
available via the Knesset website at: <www. knesset. gov. il/ protocols/
heb/ protocol_ search. aspx>. The dissenting voices at the debate preced-
ing the Knesset Committee’s vote on raising the bar of small claims
came, rather pointedly, from representatives of the Israeli Bar and of the
Manufacturers’ Association, who took specific exception with the attor-
ney representation ban. Id.
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indigent or of modest means, is justified in terms of pro-
moting substantive procedural equality at the expense of
truth discovery; the bargain struck between these two
values is regarded as acceptable and even optimal.85 It is
no wonder, therefore, that the current small claims pro-
cedure is not affected at all by the proposed civil proce-
dure reform.86
3.2 Summary Procedure
The origins of the Israeli summary procedure (seder din
mekutsar), now codified in RCP, Rules 202-214, can be
found in the Order 14 of the Rules of the Supreme
Court of England.87 The development of the procedure
in Israel has, however, largely deviated from the (now
defunct) English model.88 In fact, in its present form it
bears more resemblance to procedures available in some
Continental systems, such as the Italian procedimento
d’ingiunzione89 or the German Urkundenprozess (‘docu-
mentary procedure’),90 though the scope of the Israeli
procedure is much wider.
Rule 202 of the RCP provides for the types of claims
that may be commenced by way of summary procedure.
The most important category consists of claims for a liq-
uidated sum of money, with or without interest, ‘based
on an express or implied contract or undertaking, provi-
ded there is written evidence thereof’.91 Filing a claim
under the summary procedure entails – in contradiction
to the generally applying principles of civil litigation – a
circumscription of the defendant’s right to oppose the
action. In order to do so, the defendant is required to
apply for leave to defend; the application must be sup-
ported by an affidavit elaborating the defence in detail.92
This requirement imposes on the defendant a duty to
adopt a fixed line of defence from the outset of the pro-
ceedings, as opposed to the flexibility allowed under the
85. See Rosen-Zvi, above n. 18, at 153-4. It is worth mentioning in this
context that at the 2008 Knesset Committee debate, the proposal to
combine raising the bar of small claims with granting a right of appeal
was immediately and nearly unanimously rejected. See The Knesset,
Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, Protocol no. 598, above n.
84.
86. See below, Section 4.1. The reform concerns only the RCP which do not
apply in Small Claims Courts.
87. On the English origins of summary procedure in Israel, see generally, E.
Livneh, ‘Summary Procedures in Israel and Abroad’, 2 Israel Law
Review 210, at 210-2 (1967).
88. See Stephen Goldstein, ‘Summary Judgment Proceedings in Israeli Law’,
in A.M. Rabello (ed.), Israeli Reports to the XV International Congress
of Comparative Law (1999) 183, at 187.
89. See S. Grossi and M.C. Pagni, Commentary on the Italian Code of Civil
Procedure (2010), at 409-19; Goldstein (1999), above n. 88, at 187.
90. See generally, Livneh, above n. 87, at 215-6; W. Mertins, ‘Der Urkun-
denprozess’, 2012 Neue Justiz 133; A. Leidig and J. Jöbges, ‘Sämtliche
sind ausnahmlos alle – Zur Zulässigkeit des Urkundenprozesses’, 2014
Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 892.
91. RCP, Rule 202(1)(a). Additional types include claims for liquidated sums
of money arising out of an express statutory provision (Rule 202(1)(b));
claims by a local authority for liquidated sums due to it for municipal
taxes, levies, fees, or participation charges (Rule 202(2); claims for evic-
tion from land or rental premises, provided there is written evidence
regarding them (Rule 202(3)). See also Goren, above n. 27, at 786.
92. See RCP, Rule 205(a); CA 9654/02 Alfi Brothers Co. v. Le’umi Bank of
Israel, 59(3) PD 41, 46 (2004) (per J. Türkel J.); CA 527/07 Nahum v.
Aharonson Fund Ltd., para. E(2) (18 February 2008), Nevo Legal Data-
base (by subscription) (per E. Rubinstein J.).
general rules.93 In a summary procedure case, the court
is authorised to base its decision solely on the written
motions by the parties (the complaint and the applica-
tion for leave to defend), and the hearing held on the
defendant’s application.94 Moreover, the application
may be rejected – for reasons that are to be recorded –
even without conducting a hearing on the matter.95 The
court also has discretion to make the leave to defend
conditional or limited to certain terms.96
Obviously, the above features of summary procedure
offer considerable procedural advantages to the claim-
ant.97 It is especially so given the fact that the sanction
for improperly bringing a claim within the summary
procedure framework is not dismissal, but merely the
striking out of the heading of the complaint and its
transfer to the ordinary track.98 These advantages can be
justified in light of the summary procedure’s conception
as an expedited debt collection device.99 Its rationale lies
in the presumption that the defendant has no valid
defence.100 The debt collection rationale is evident in
the transfer of two kinds of claims originally falling
within the scope of summary procedure, to the compe-
tence of execution offices, thus eliminating the need to
initiate a court proceeding altogether. First, claims of
holders of negotiable instruments were made directly
93. The accepted practice in Israel makes it possible for the defendant to
limit himself/herself, in the statement of defence, to a denial of the fac-
tual allegations made by the claimant, without presenting a coherent
own version of events. See Goldstein et al., above n. 19, at 104.
94. CA 5480/98 Menora Insurance Co. v. Abo, 52(4) PD 476, at 479
(1998); LCA 1265/08 Mondar v. Harel Insurance Co. Ltd., para. D(3)
(27 April 2008), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (per E. Rubin-
stein J.).
95. RCP, Rule 205(g). This provision follows the (general) rule concerning
interlocutory motions set out in Rule 241(d), according to which the
court may decide on the motion without cross-examination of the affi-
ant. See Goldstein et al., above n. 19, at 109.
96. LCA 271/14 Raz v. Peled (27 January 2014), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription).
97. The previous incarnation of the Israeli RCP, adopted in 1963, contained
a provision enabling setting an expedited trial date (‘queue jumping’)
for cases filed under the summary procedure, once leave to defend had
been granted. This provision was dropped from the 1984 version of
RCP, but for some time confusion remained as to whether the practice
of ‘queue jumping’ continued to persist in Israeli courts. See Goldstein
et al., above n. 19, at 111, 113-4. It seems, however, that by now this
practice has been abandoned, and once leave to defend is granted, the
file is simply routed to the regular track. See Schwartz, above n. 21, at
310.
98. See Goldstein (1999), above n. 88, at 194. In comparison, under Ger-
man law, non-compliance with the pre-requirements of the ‘documen-
tary procedure’ leads to the claim’s dismissal by the court. See Code of
Civil Procedure (Zivilprozessordnung, ZPO) § 597 II; Mertins, above n.
90, at 135; Leidig and Jöbges, above n. 90, at 893.
99. Goldstein et al., above n. 19, at 110. For a similar view of the German
documentary procedure, see e.g. OLG München, Urt. v. 21.9.2011 – 7
U 4956/10, Rz. II.1.e), available at: <http:// openjur. de/ u/ 493791.
html>.
100. Goldstein et al., above n. 19, at 111. See also Alfi Brothers Co., 59(3)
PD, at 46; CA 1471/06 Agiv Consulting and Management Ltd. v. Rabi-
nowitz, para. 5 (6 March 2008), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription)
(per E. Hayut J.); LCA 8364/07 Menora Insurance Co. Ltd. v. El Al Isra-
el Airlines Ltd., para. 6 (13 March 2011), Nevo Legal Database (by sub-
scription) (per A. Grunis J.).
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enforceable,101 and since 2002 – claims for liquidated
sums not exceeding NIS 50,000, increased to NIS
75,000 in 2015 (approx. EUR 18,300 at the current
exchange rate).102 Only if the debtor files an ‘objection’
to the claim (equivalent to the application for leave to
defend), is the file transferred to the competent court to
be dealt with according to the summary procedure.103
And yet the liberal attitude vis-à-vis the summary pro-
cedure by the Israeli jurisprudence – which does not
seem to be shared by other jurisdictions104 – has resul-
ted in its extension beyond the narrow rationale of (pre-
sumably uncontested) debt collection.105 The primary
reason for this trend lies with the relaxation of the writ-
ten evidence requirement. This precondition for the
application of summary procedure was taken to require
(based on an analogy from an unrelated provision of the
French Code civil, dealing with the admissibility of oral
versus written evidence)106 not full or complete proof in
writing of all elements of the claim, but merely a ‘com-
mencement of proof’ (commencement de preuve), to which
oral evidence could be adduced.107
As a counterweight to their rather lax handling of the
elements of Rule 202 delineating the applicability of the
summary procedure,108 Israeli courts have adopted a
101. The relevant provision is Section 81A of the Execution Law, 5727-1967,
21 LSI 112 (1966-67), as amended in 1968. See also Goldstein et al.,
above n. 19, at 111.
102. See Execution Law, Section 81A1; Goren, above n. 27, at 789. For the
2015 amendment, see Execution Law (Amendment No. 46),
5776-2015, SH No. 2495, at 196.
103. Execution Law, Section 81A(c), 81A1(d).
104. In Germany, the restrictive interpretation of the documentary proce-
dure’s scope of application has been lately justified on the basis of its
‘systemic incompatibility’ (Systemwidrigkeit) with the general principles
of German procedural law. See M. Fervers, ‘Urkundenprozess bei Werk-
lohnforderungen’, 2014 Zeitschrift für das Juristische Studium 337,
343, 345.
105. See Goldstein (1999), above n. 88, at 195; A. Klement and R. Shapira,
‘Ya’ilut ve-Tsedek be-Seder ha-Din ha-Ezrahi – Gisha Parshanit Hada-
sha’ [‘Efficency and Justice in Civil Procedure – A New Interpretative
Approach’], 7 Mishpat ve-Asakim 75, 105 n. 103 (2007) (in Hebrew).
106. Art. 1341 of the French Code prescribes for the more important con-
tracts the requirement of evidence in writing; Art. 1347 confines this
requirement to a commencement de preuve par écrit. The French Code
was used by the Israeli jurisprudence in the interpretation of the eviden-
tiary provision of Art. 80 of the Ottoman Code of Civil Procedure, still
in force in Israel, which is similar to Art. 1341 of the Code civil. See
generally Livneh, above n. 87, at 213.
107. See CA 236/64 ‘Arda’ Co. v. Katz, 18(3) PD 518, 522 (1964); CA
465/66 Gelbar v. Turner, 20(4) PD 772, at 775-6 (1966); Goren, above
n. 27, at 785. In contrast, the German jurisprudence demands, in princi-
ple, documentary proof in relation to all the facts contained in the
claim, in order for the claim to be admissible under the documentary
procedure track. See Mertins, above n. 90, at 134-5. Recently, a new
and even more restrictive interpretation has been adopted by the Court
of Appeals in Schleswig. The court ruled, breaking with earlier jurispru-
dence, that the above requirement cannot be waived even concerning
the facts that are not in dispute between the parties. See OLG Schles-
wig, Urt. v. 30.8.2013 – 1 U 11/13, 2014 NJW 945. This approach
received favourable reviews from the commentators. See Leidig and
Jöbges, above n. 90, at 895; Fervers, above n. 104, at 343.
108. As to the expansive interpretation of the ‘contract or undertaking’ and
‘liquidated sum’ requirements, see Summ. 609/65 Rozovsky v. Zbeideh,
20(1) PD 236 (1966); Goren, above n. 27, at 784. However, it has been
held that subrogation claims in personal injury actions are generally not
well-suited for the summary procedure track. See LCA 8364/07 Menora
Insurance Co., paras. 10-13 (per A. Grunis J.).
lenient approach towards granting leave to defend,
which effectively reinstates the claim upon the regular
procedural track.109 According to the jurisprudence, the
court’s disposition of the motion for leave should not be
used as a substitute for judging the merits of the case.110
At this stage, it is sufficient for the defendant to show a
prima facie defence, which may be based on oral against
written evidence;111 the application for leave will be
rejected only if it is clear beyond doubt that the defence
has no chance of succeeding.112 The mere fact that the
defence lacks credibility in the eyes of the court is not
sufficient ground per se to deny the leave to defend.113
This approach is largely motivated by the constitutional
concern over unduly restricting the defendants’ right of
access to courts.114 However, the accommodating policy
vis-à-vis the defendants should by no means be con-
strued as effectively nullifying the utility of the summa-
ry procedure for the claimant. In most cases initiated
under the procedure, leave to defend is not requested in
the first place; where the defendant does apply for the
leave, and even in large claims, its granting is not assur-
ed.115 Leave to defend will be denied if the defend-
ant can only put up a ‘sham defence’ – i.e. one that is
manifestlyuntrue, insufficient, or irrelevant on its face –
or if the defence collapses entirely under cross-examina-
tion.116 Although the quality of the defendant’s evidence
is not examined in depth at the application for leave to
109. See Goldstein et al., above n. 19, at 109; Klement and Shapira, above
n. 105, at 105 n. 103.
110. CA 10189/07 Sasson v. Mizrahi Tefahot Bank Ltd., para. 8 (15 June
2009), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (per Y. Danziger J.).
111. Goldstein et al., above n. 19, at 109; CA 10189/07 Sasson, para. 8 (per
Y. Danziger J.).
112. Alfi Brothers Co., 59(3) PD, at 46; CA 10189/07 Sasson, para. 8 (per Y.
Danziger J.); CA 1471/06 Agiv Consulting and Management Ltd., para.
5.
113. CA 518/87 Pateljean v. Union Bank of Israel (25 November 1993),
Nevo Legal Database (by subscription); CA 10189/07 Sasson, para. 8
(per Y. Danziger J.).
114. See Goldstein et al., above n. 19, at 109; CA 10189/07 Sasson (per A.
Procaccia J.).
115. According to a study conducted in 1980 in the course of the delibera-
tions of the Advisory Committee on Civil Procedure appointed by the
Minister of Justice, applications for leave to defend were filed in less
than 10% of the summary procedure claims falling within the jurisdic-
tion of the Magistrates’ Courts, and in more than half of the claims filed
in the District Courts. The leave was granted in 24% to 37% of cases
by the Magistrates’ Courts, with the rate of success rising to a little over
50% at the District Courts level. See Goldstein (1999), above n. 88, at
198-9. In 2002, during parliamentary debates over the proposal to
broaden the ‘direct execution’ track (see above, notes 102-103, and
accompanying text), roughly similar figures were presented (applica-
tions for leave to defend filed in 15% of cases with about half the appli-
cations successful). See The Knesset, Constitution, Law and Justice
Committee, Protocol no. 429 (29 January 2002), available via the Knes-
set website at: <www. knesset. gov. il/ protocols/ heb/ protocol_ search.
aspx>. Even more stark is the data offered recently in the context of
raising the maximum limit of ‘direct execution’ claims: a motion for
leave to defend is filed in only 4% of these claims, and its rate of suc-
cess stands at 15%. See The Knesset, Constitution, Law and Justice
Committee, Protocol no. 20 (7 July 2015), available via the Knesset
website at: <www. knesset. gov. il/ protocols/ heb/ protocol_ search. aspx>.
116. See CA 1471/06 Agiv Consulting and Management Ltd., para. 5; CA
527/07 Nahum, para. E(3). Nahum provides an example of a sham
defence in the summary procedure context: claim of a promise by a
deceased person unsubstantiated by any external evidence. Id., para.
E(4).
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defend stage, the defendant’s (low) probability of suc-
cess is a factor that can be taken into account by the
court when deciding to subject the leave to conditions or
impose a security on the defendant.117
Over the years, summary procedure has become a
‘deeply rooted’ Israeli institution,118 despite being con-
sidered an exception to general procedural rules.119
Attempts to abolish the procedure in Israel have so far
been unsuccessful, largely due to the stubborn resist-
ance of the trial lawyer community.120 Indeed, some
commentators have observed that the efficiency ration-
ale for creating a separate privileged track for claimants
with a prima facie sound claim appears sound.121 And
yet, summary procedure has been subject to harsh and
mounting criticism. The arguments against it are varied.
It is denounced by some en bloc as disproportionately
favouring the claimants (often of the institutional ‘repeat
player’ variety, such as banks) to the detriment of the
defendants, especially those of limited means, thus
impairing the principle of equality and the right of
access to court.122 On a more pragmatic level, the cur-
rent summary procedure has been criticised for being
overextended in scope beyond its original debt collec-
tion rationale.123 It has also been asserted that in many
cases the Israeli summary procedure fails to achieve its
designated purpose of providing a mechanism to swiftly
dispose of certain types of (presumably well-grounded)
claims.124 Albeit some of the deficiencies of summary
procedure, as it exists today, could probably be
addressed by a limited reform,125 proposals to scrap this
institution altogether have gained currency in recent
years. Abolition of summary procedure was recommen-
117. Alfi Brothers Co., 59(3) PD, at 47; CA 527/07 Nahum, para. E(8).
118. This was the argument put forward against abolishing the procedure,
when the issue came under discussion in the early 1980s. See Y. Dan-
ziger, ‘Ha-Va’ada ha-Meya’etset le-Inyan Seder ha-Din ha-Ezrahi
(Va’adat Etzi’oni)’ [The Advisory Committee on Civil Procedure (Etzi’oni
Committee)], 34 Ha-Praklit 159, 162 (1981) (in Hebrew).
119. See Menora Insurance Co., 52(4) PD, at 479 (per A. Barak CJ); Goren,
above n. 27, at 783.
120. On the proposals to abolish the procedure in the 1970s and their ulti-
mate failure, see Danziger, above n. 118, at 161-2. It might be worth
noting, in comparison, that in France a (more or less) similar procedure
had existed under Arts. 404-413 of the ‘old’ Code of Civil Procedure,
but was gradually repealed and is absent from the new Code adopted
in 1975. See P. Herzog and M. Weser, Civil Procedure in France
(1967), at 488-94; A. Kohl, ‘Romanist Legal Systems’, in M. Capeletti
(ed.), XVI-6 International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Civil Pro-
cedure (1984) 57, at 88.
121. See Schwartz, above n. 21, at 293-6; Klement and Shapira, above n.
105, at 107. This rationale was also highlighted in the explanatory note
to the bill introducing the ‘direct execution’ track in 2002. See Execu-
tion Law Bill (Amendment No. 25) (Summary Procedure Claims),
5762-2002, HH No. 3147, at 714.
122. See Rosen-Zvi, above n. 18, at 154-5. On the inherent advantages of
‘repeat players’ vis-à-vis ‘one-shotters’ in civil litigation, see generally,
Galanter, above n. 72; S. Talesh, ‘How the “Haves” Come out Ahead in
the Twenty-First Century’, 62 De Paul Law Review 59 (2013).
123. See Goldstein (1999), above n. 88, at 195-6, 201-2; Schwartz, above n.
21, at 309-10.
124. As explained by Schwartz, above n. 21, at 310-1, this is due to the
courts’ lenient handling of leave to defend motions, on the one hand,
and of lack of priority in handling claims originally filed under the sum-
mary procedure, once the leave to defend has been granted, on the
other hand.
ded in the 2008 ‘Ronen Report’ dealing with the ways to
improve the effectiveness of court proceedings in
Israel.126 The report’s recommendation has been adop-
ted in the 2014 Draft Rules.127 This does not mean,
however, that the fate of summary procedure in Israel is
sealed. Even in the event the Draft Rules in their pro-
posed version ultimately become black-letter law, which
is by no means certain,128 they will not affect the ‘direct
execution’ track described above – which is, in practice,
the summary procedure’s particularly important incar-
nation and has just recently been expanded.129 More-
over, data from a recently published study of judicial
workload in Israel show that the summary track does
indeed provide for significantly shorter delays in dispos-
ing of cases.130 These findings, although insufficient in
themselves for a comprehensive assessment of its role
and desirability, have been brought up in the recent
polemic against the Draft Rules as at least necessitating
a thorough justification for abolishing the summary pro-
cedure, based on empirical evidence.131 Another argu-
ment in favour of retaining the summary track is its con-
tribution to reducing the parties’ (and especially the
debtors-defendants’) trial costs132 and to encouraging
125. For some suggestions, see Id., at 311-3. These include, inter alia, beef-
ing up the ‘written evidence’ requirement in order to assure that only
well-substantiated claims are privileged; holding an immediate hearing
on the merits in cases where the defence is manifestly weak; empower-
ing court registrars to decide on motions for leave to defend; and giving
the court wide discretions to transfer cases from the summary to the
regular track.
126. State of Israel, Courts Administration, Du’akh ha-Va’ada li-Vhinat Dar-
kei Ye’ul ha-Halikhim ha-Mishpati’im be-Reshut Kvod ha-Shofetet
Ruth Ronen [Report of the Commission on the Ways to Improve the
Effectiveness of Legal Proceedings, Headed by Esteemed Judge Ruth
Ronen] (2008), at 4-6 (in Hebrew), available at: <http:// elyon1. court.
gov. il/ heb/ veadot/ vaadat_ ronen. pdf> [hereinafter: Ronen Report].
127. Draft Rules, above n. 30, at 2. The Draft Rules put forward a special
fast track procedure for eviction claims from rented premises, which
currently fall under the scope of the summary procedure. See Id., at 49.
See also above, n. 91.
128. See below, Section 4.2.
129. Rule 23 of the Draft Rules describes a ‘leave to defend [procedure] aris-
ing from legislation’. The legislation in question is Execution Law, Sec-
tion 81A-81A1; see above notes 101-103.
130. The study is based on the internationally accepted ‘case weights’ meth-
odology, designed to measure relative time length necessary for adjudi-
cating various types of cases. See K. Weinshall-Margel, I. Galon & I.
Taraboulos, ‘Yetsirat Madad Mishkalot Tikim le-Ha’arakhat ha-Omes
ha-Shiputi be-Yisra’el’ [‘Creating a Case Weight Index for Measuring
Judicial Workload in Israel’], 44 Mishpatim 769 (2015) (in Hebrew).
According to the study, the aggregated ‘weight’ of a summary proce-
dure case is 5.3 times ‘lighter’ than that of its regular procedure coun-
terpart in a Magistrates’ Court, and 2.7 times – in a District Court.
SeeId., at 813-4, Table 2.
131. See E. Taussig and A. Kleiman, ‘Ha-Omnam Tovim ha-Shnayim min ha-
Ehad? Ribuy Maslulim le-Hagashat Tov’ana Ezrahit’ [‘Is Two Better
Than One? Multitude of Tracks for Initiating Civil Proceedings’], Part E.
1, Paper Presented at the Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv University, March
2015 (on file with the author) (in Hebrew).
132. This point was stressed both in the explanatory notes to the 2015 bill
proposing to raise the bar of ‘direct execution’ claims – see Execution
Law Bill (Amendment No. 46), 5775-2015, HH (Gov.) No. 920, at 608
– and in the subsequent Knesset Committee debate: see The Knesset,
Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, Protocol no. 20, above n.
115. See also below notes 174 and 175, and the accompanying text.
193
Ehud Brosh doi: 10.5553/ELR.000052 - ELR December 2015 | No. 4
settlements.133 Some writers also point out that its exis-
tence is likely to positively affect the behaviour of the
parties ex ante.134 The survival of this privileged track,
at least in some form, therefore seems assured, even
though its overall record within the Israeli system
remains controversial.135
3.3 Fast Track Procedure
In 2001, an important innovation was introduced into
the Israeli civil procedure system. An amendment to
RCP added Rules 214A-214P, creating a new ‘fast track’
procedure (seder din mahir). The amendment was clearly
inspired by – and closely modelled on – the 1998 reform
of English civil procedure as a result of the recommen-
dations of the Woolf Report.136 The fast track is specifi-
cally designed for claims not exceeding NIS 75,000
(approximately EUR 17,750 at the current exchange
rate)137 filed in Magistrates’ Courts under the regular or
the summary procedure (the latter in cases when leave
to defend has been granted), as well as for those trans-
ferred from the Small Claims Courts.138 Nevertheless, a
Magistrates’ Court has wide discretion to transfer claims
from the fast to the regular track139 and vice versa (in
the latter case subject to the consent of all parties).140 In
making these determinations the court is to consider
factors such as the complexity of the facts, issues, and
evidence involved; the number of parties; the complica-
tions caused by the existence of counterclaims and
impleaders; the extent of required oral evidence and
expert testimony; the implications of the case for the
general public; as well as the importance of the claim’s
133. On inducing settlements as a chief social purpose of the institution of
trial, see Shavell, above n. 53, at 415. According to (partial) data set
forth during the 2015 Knesset Committee debate, up to 75% of cases
where an application for leave to defend is filed at end in a settlement.
See The Knesset, Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, Protocol no.
20, above n. 115.
134. See Klement and Shapira, above n. 105, at 106-7; Taussig and Kleiman,
above n. 131, Part E.2.
135. Compare the negative assessment by Rosen-Zvi, above n. 18, at 156-7
(viewing the summary procedure as an inegalitarian ‘procedural barrier’)
with the more positive opinion of Taussig and Kleiman, above n. 131,
Part B.1 (the summary procedure track represents a balancing of the
need to save judicial time on the one hand, and the interests of fairness
and truth discovery on the other). See also the various arguments raised
during the 2015 Knesset Committee debate: The Knesset, Constitution,
Law and Justice Committee, Protocol no. 20, above n. 115.
136. See R. Cohen and M. Klein, Seder Din Mahir be-Beit Mishpat ha-Sha-
lom [Fast Track Procedure at the Magistrates’ Court] (2005), at 7-9 (in
Hebrew); Goldstein et al., above n. 19, at 114, 115-6; Taussig and Klei-
man, above n. 131, Part B.3. For an economic analysis of the Woolf
reform in England, see A. Ogus, ‘Civil Procedure Reform and Economic
Analysis’, in C. Ott and G. von Wangenheim (eds.), Essays in Law and
Economics IV: Public Law, Private Law, and Adjudication (1998) 237.
137. The original ceiling was set at NIS 50,000 and was raised to NIS 75,000
by an amendment to RCP adopted in 2009; see KT 6902, at 1920. In
comparison, the fast track procedure in England is currently subject to a
GBP 25,000 ceiling. See Andrews, above n. 58, at 94-5.
138. RCP, Rules 214B, 214B1. Road accident compensation claims and class
actions are generally excluded from the fast track. See Goldstein et al.,
above n. 19, at 115; Goren, above n. 27, at 883-5.
139. RCP, Rule 214L.
140. Id., Rule 214B(b).
speedy resolution, in light of its nature and the identity
of the parties.141
The chief purpose of the fast track procedure is to make
sure that the proceedings are conducted efficiently and
within a short timeframe, reducing administrative costs
in a way commensurate with the relatively low sums
involved.142 The fast track, thus, obviously shares a
common goal with the small claims procedure.143 This
goal is reflected in the provisions imposing on parties in
fast track cases various obligations not required under
the regular procedure. These include the duty to sup-
port the pleadings by affidavits verifying the facts
alleged and to attach expert opinions and legal authori-
ties to the pleadings.144 The parties are also enjoined to
provide ‘early disclosure’: they must attach a list of all
documents relevant to the case (and not only those on
which they intend to rely) as well as the relevant docu-
ments themselves, as long as they are in their posses-
sion.145 Another innovative requirement concerns wit-
ness affidavits: these must be filed within 45 days after
the pleadings, and serve as substitute for the direct
examination of the witnesses; a witness from whom an
affidavit has not been provided is precluded from testi-
fying at the trial, except by special permission of the
court.146 In order to expedite the fast track proceedings,
limitations are also imposed on the filing of counter-
claims and impleaders, as well as on obtaining prelimi-
141. Id., Rule 214L(b). See also, Goren, above n. 27, at 885. Another factor,
suggested by the jurisprudence, is the potential impact of the case on
further litigation. So, Judge Gerstel from the Tel-Aviv District Court
decided to transfer a claim from the fast to the regular track when it
became clear that it was a ‘first shot’ in a potentially large-scale con-
sumer litigation, involving scores of claimants; see LA (TA) 1977/02
Neve Schuster Co. Ltd. v. Harush (14 July 2003, unreported). See also
A. Orenstein and Y. Efron, ‘Le’an Ne’elam Seder ha-Din ha-Mahir? O
Kulanu Seder Din Mahir?’ [‘Where Did the Fast Track Procedure Disap-
pear? Or Is It All Fast Track Procedure Now?’, Part D.3, paper presen-
ted at the Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv University, March 2015 (on file with
the author) (in Hebrew).
142. See LCA 646/14 Ashtrom Contracting Co. v. New Kopel Ltd., para. 7 (8
May 2014), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (per Z. Zilbertal J.);
Goldstein et al., above n. 19, at 116. The explanatory notes published
by the Ministry of Justice to the final version of the rules introducing the
fast track procedure also emphasised that in the cases involved the swift
resolution of the dispute and the reduction of costs are particularly
important to the parties themselves. See Cohen and Klein, above n.
136, at 9, 66. On the efficiency rationale of the fast track procedure,
see also Orenstein and Efron, above n. 141, Part B.
143. LCA 646/14 Ashtrom Contracting Co., para. 7.
144. RCP, Rule 214C; LCA 3312/04 Assurances générales de France v. Offi-
cial Receiver, 60(3) PD, at 245, 252 (2005) (per A. Grunis J.).
145. RCP, Rule 214H; see also Goren, above n. 27, at 888; Orenstein and
Efron, above n. 141, Part D.2. Thus, disclosure becomes an integral part
of the pleadings themselves, whereas the general Israeli rule sees it as
part of the discovery process taking place after the pleadings. See Gold-
stein et al., above n. 19, at 117.
146. RCP, Rule 214I; see also Goldstein et al., above n. 19, at 117.
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nary relief.147 The court may hold only one pre-trial
conference, and the trial itself should normally take
place over a single day.148 The judgment in a fast track
case is to be rendered immediately after the trial and in
any case no later than 14 days thereafter; the reasons
must be concise unless a more detailed reasoning is
required due to the novelty or the public importance of
the case.149 Although the fast track provisions of the
RCP do not themselves contain any limitations on the
right of appeal, the goals of the fast track procedure dic-
tate a particularly restrictive review policy of fast track
judgments by appellate courts, and especially by the
Supreme Court.150
As evident from the overview above, the fast track pro-
cedure is based on two complementary principles:
severe restriction of the litigants’ procedural freedom to
shape the proceedings and their course, coupled with a
relative increase of the administrative powers of the
judge.151 Nonetheless, even the latter’s discretionary
powers are curtailed in comparison with the regular pro-
cedure by inflexible time limits.152 The fairly rigid
nature of the fast track procedure was criticised immedi-
ately after its adoption, and many of its provisions were
even declared void in a (later overturned) Magistrates’
Court decision, as being contrary to the constitutional
right to a fair hearing and violating the principle of judi-
cial independence.153 However, despite initial doubts
and criticism, the controversy rapidly subsided, and the
fast track has been universally accepted as essential and
147. RCP, Rules 214E-214F, 214M. A counterclaim may be filed only if it
does not involve additional parties that are not already part of the
action and if it is either itself suitable for the fast track or arises of the
same transaction or occurrence as the original claim; an impleader may
only be filed after obtaining permission by the court. Restrictions on
preliminary relief, on the other hand, are not substantial, but rather
apply to the timing of applications and to the decision process. See
Goldstein et al., above n. 19, at 117-8; Goren, above n. 27, at 887-8,
890-1; Orenstein and Efron, above n. 141, Part D.1.
148. RCP, Rules 214K, 214N. In order to facilitate a settlement between the
parties, it is specifically provided that the parties themselves must attend
the pre-trial conference. Id., Rule 214K(e); see also Goldstein et al.,
above n. 19, at 119.
149. RCP, Rule 214P. See also Goren, above n. 27, at 891; Goldstein et al.,
above n. 19, at 120. This is similar to the provisions applying in Small
Claims Courts. See above n. 69, and the accompanying text.
150. See LCA 646/14 Ashtrom Contracting Co., para. 7.
151. See Schwartz, above n. 21, at 280-1. The court’s authority to limit the
examination of witnesses, under RCP, Rule 214N(c) is central in this
regard.
152. See Orenstein and Efron, above n. 141, Part B; Schwartz, above n. 21,
at 281.
153. See CC (Jerusalem Magistrates’ Ct.) 4050/01 Municipality of Jerusalem
v. Muhammad (16 July 2002), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription).
This decision by Judge M. Agmon-Gonen was reversed on appeal to the
District Court: CA (Jer’) 3350/02 Attorney-General v. Municipality of
Jerusalem (14 July 2003), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription). For
the argument of the fast track provisions’ unconstitutionality, see gen-
erally Y. Shilo, ‘Tsedek Dahuy Adif al I-Tsedek Mahir’ [‘Delayed Justice
Is Preferable to Speedy Injustice’], 3 Alei Mishpat 317 (2003) (in
Hebrew); M. Agmon-Gonen, ‘I-Tlut Shiputit? Ha-Iyum mi-Bifnim?’
[‘Judicial Independence? An Internal Threat?’, 10 Ha-Mishpat 213, at
238-41 (2005) (in Hebrew). For an overview of the controversy, see
Orenstein and Efron, above n. 141, Part C.
highly successful.154 The fast track’s procedural limita-
tions have been given the seal of approval by the Israeli
Supreme Court: according to Justice Zilbertal in a
recent decision, the notion of justice is a general and
complex concept integrating, among others, considera-
tions such as the finality of proceedings and the need to
allocate judicial resources reasonably; these considera-
tions carry special weight in the context of the fast track
procedure.155
And yet, paradoxically, the fast track’s much-fêted suc-
cess might carry the seed of its own undoing. At first
glance, and contrary to the summary procedure, the fast
track is not slated to be abolished in the 2014 Draft
Rules. In fact, it is the only special procedure whose
retention is envisaged.156 However, the relative impor-
tance of the fast track as a specific procedural route for
low(er)-value claims looks considerably diminished.157
This is due to the fact that in the Draft Rules the regu-
lar procedure has largely been amalgamated with the
fast track: all proceedings are to be filed in the same
manner;158 restrictions currently applying only to the
fast track procedure are imposed generally on initiating
counterclaims and impleaders;159 the fast track’s strict
discovery requirements are to be applied universally.160
Moreover, according to the Draft Rules, the court is
granted broadest discretion to transfer claims not only
from the fast to the regular track, but also in the oppo-
site direction – without the consent of the parties.161
The combined result of these provisions is a considera-
ble blurring of the line separating fast track cases from
the ‘standard’ ones.162
The wisdom of such an approach has been questioned in
recent reactions to the contemplated reform. As the crit-
ics point out, essentially erasing the procedural bounda-
ries between small and simple claims on the one hand,
and large and complex ones, on the other, does not take
into account the differences inherent in the treatment of
various type of cases, and could cause a general deterio-
ration of the overall quality of judicial work (and in par-
ticular – of the standards of inquiry applied by courts),
154. See Taussig and Kleiman, above n. 131, Part B.3; Orenstein and Efron,
above n. 141, Part B. The fast track was praised in the 2008 Ronen
Report, which emphasised that 90% of the cases brought via the fast
track route were decided during the first session of the court. The
Report recommended raising the bar of fast track claims to NIS
100,000. See Ronen Report, above n. 126, at 6. The Report’s recom-
mendation was partially adopted in 2009; see above n. 131.
155. LCA 646/14 Ashtrom Contracting Co., para. 7.
156. Draft Rules, above n. 30, at 2, 10.
157. The provisions relating to the fast track procedure has been reduced
from sixteen in the current version of the RCP to just four in the Draft
Rules (Rules 104-105, 107-108). See Orenstein and Efron, above n.
141, Part D.
158. Draft Rules, above n. 30, at 2, 10.
159. Id., at 6. See also, Orenstein and Efron, above n. 141, Part D.1; Taussig
and Kleiman, above n. 131, Part C.1, n. 69.
160. See Orenstein and Efron, above n. 141, Part D.2.
161. Draft Rules 104(B), 107. See also Taussig and Kleiman, above n. 131,
Part C.1; Orenstein and Efron, above n. 141, Part D.3. Under the cur-
rent regime, consent of the parties is required for a claim to be transfer-
red to the fast track from the regular one; see above n. 140, and the
accompanying text.
162. See Orenstein and Efron, above n. 141, Part E.
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especially in (more) complex cases.163 Additionally,
there is concern that the proposed radical extension of
the court’s procedural discretion would, in effect, lead
to a ‘subjectivisation’ of the judicial process in accord-
ance with the personal predilections – or short-term
considerations – of the trial judge.164 This, of course,
would be diametrically opposed to the desired goal of
harmonisation of civil procedure and would also
adversely affect the parties’ ability to adjust their behav-
iour ex ante.165
Time will tell whether – and to what extent – the above
criticisms will be able to influence the course and the
outcome of the civil procedure reform in Israel. As the
ultimate fate of the Draft Rules remains uncertain, so is
the future place of the fast track in the Israeli system.
4 ‘Delayed Justice’ or ‘Swift
Injustice’? The Israeli
Dilemma and Its Attempted
Solutions
4.1 Speeding up Justice in Israel in the 2000s –
Theory and Practice
Roscoe Pound opened his famous 1906 speech by
observing that ‘[d]issatisfaction with the administration
of justice is as old as law’.166 Today, these timeless
words ring as true as ever. The discontent over the
functioning of the justice system, and in particular over
the scourge of ‘slow justice’ is also truly a global one.167
The public in almost every system is habitually (and
increasingly) rankled over the length of time needed to
obtain final judicial decisions;168 in more extreme cases
the court system’s inefficiency in dealing with proceed-
ings brought before it presents a real impediment to
economic growth.169 Israel is no exception to the global
trend. The issue of ‘speeding up’ justice has been on the
agenda of the legal community at least since the 1970s.
163. Taussig and Kleiman, above n. 131, Part C.1; Orenstein and Efron,
above n. 141, Part D.3.
164. See Taussig and Kleiman, above n. 131, Part E.2.
165. Id.
166. See R. Pound, ‘The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Adminis-
tration of Justice’, Address before the Annual Convention of the Ameri-
can Bar Association (29 August 1906), reprinted in 48 South Texas Law
Review 853, at 853 (2007). See also B. Friedman, ‘Dissatisfaction with
the Administration of Justice: A Retrospective (and a Look Ahead)’, 82
Indiana Law Journal 1193 (2007).
167. A. Klement and Z. Neeman, ‘Civil Justice Reform: A Mechanism Design
Framework’, 164 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 52,
at 53 (2008) (‘[I]f there is one thing common to different legal systems
around the world, it is a sense of crisis, a concern that delay and litiga-
tion costs are increasing, and that the judicial system is unable to satisfy
demand for its dispute resolution services’).
168. For the economic analysis of excessive court delay and caseload crises,
see R.A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 9th edn. (2014), at 816-9.
169. Such is the tenor of a recent International Monetary Fund study on the
Italian justice system. See G. Esposito, S. Lanau & S. Pompe, ‘Judicial
System Reform in Italy – A Key to Growth’, IMF Working Paper 14/32
(February 2014), available at: <www. imf. org/ external/ pubs/ ft/ wp/
2014/ wp1432. pdf>.
On the one side of the continuous debate, the ‘justice
delayed is justice denied’ adage is highlighted,170 while
the right to have one’s claim tried and resolved within a
reasonable time frame is viewed as an essential part of a
broader human right – that of access to justice.171 On
the other side, concerns are raised over possible negative
impact of a forcible reduction of delays on the rights of
the parties and the quality of judicial work, as epitom-
ised in the expression (coined by the late Israeli
Supreme Court Justice S.Z. Cheshin) ‘delayed justice is
preferable to swift injustice’.172 The chief preoccupation
is that paying too much attention to the speed of justice,
and to ‘efficiency’ considerations in general (usually nar-
rowly reduced, in this context, to limiting administra-
tive costs) would cause irreparable damage to its quality
by impairing the court’s primary mission – that of
assuring a fair process to the parties and determining
the truth.173 In law-end-economics terms, these con-
cerns broadly reflect two types of costs, the reduction of
which is viewed as procedural law’s economic objective:
those of erroneous judicial decisions and those of oper-
ating the procedural system,174 and the tension between
them.175 Additional worries are about judicial independ-
ence and the public trust in the justice system, which
170. S. Goldstein, ‘Tsedek Mahir – Mabat Hashva’ati’ [‘Speedy Justice – A
Comparative Look’], 9 Alei Mishpat 19, 19 (2011) (in Hebrew).
171. Id., at 19-23.
172. Shilo, above n. 153, at 317.
173. See Shetreet, above n. 35, at 644 (‘[e]fficiency, however important it
may be, is not the ultimate value. First and foremost, it has to be assur-
ed that the court system conducts a fair trial, so that speedy and effi-
cient justice does not turn into swift injustice’); Shilo, above n. 153, at
320-7.
174. See R. Cooter and T. Ulen, Law & Economics, 5th edn. (2008), at 417;
Posner, above n. 168, at 773. Greater judicial accuracy has important
social effects, as it enhances deterrence of undesired behaviour by ren-
dering the legal consequences more certain and thereby encouraging
the settlement of claims; see Ogus, above n. 136, at 238. On the value
of accuracy and costs of judicial error, see generally, L. Kaplow, ‘The
Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis’, 23 Journal of
Legal Studies 307 (1994); L. Kaplow and S. Shavell, ‘Accuracy in the
Determination of Liability’, 37 Journal of Law & Economics 1 (1994); L.
Kaplow and S. Shavell, ‘Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages’, 39
Journal of Law & Economics 191 (1996).
175. According to Posner, the basic insight of economic analysis as applied to
procedural law is that ‘the law is engaged in making tradeoffs between
the accuracy and cost of trials’; see R.A. Posner, ‘An Economic
Approach to the Law of Evidence’, 51 Stanford Law Review 1477, at
1485 (1999). The inverse relation between the two types of costs is
based on the assumption that spending more resources on the process
would lead to more discovery and enable the court to achieve a more
informed decision, thus reducing the probability of error; there is an
optimum point where marginal benefit equals marginal cost. See Id. at
1481-1482; Cooter and Ulen, above n. 174, at 417; R.D. Cooter and
D.L. Rubinfeld, ‘Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolu-
tion’, Journal of Economic Literature 1067, at 1087-1088 (1989). Cf.,
for a criticism of the assumption that the costs of the trial are a positive
function of the amount of evidence, and that the effect of additional
evidence on the outcome of the case will tend to decrease, R. Lempert,
‘The Economic Analysis of Evidence Law: Common Sense on Stilts’, 87
Virginia Law Review 1619, at 1641-1643 (2001). There is also some
reason to doubt ‘whether disputants value cumbersome procedural
rules designed to produce accuracy as highly as do courts’, as evidenced
by the relative procedural simplicity of private systems of dispute resolu-
tion. See Cooter and Rubinfeld, Id. at 1088.
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might both be jeopardised, so it is feared, by over-
emphasis on ‘efficiency’.176
In practice, outside and beyond the theoretical debate
over the court system’s desirable priorities, considerable
efforts to reduce case backlog have been made in Israel
since 2001, bringing a certain – albeit by no means dras-
tic – improvement.177 This modest achievement is the
result of combined factors: legislative reforms such as
introducing the fast track procedure,178 raising the bar
of small claims,179 and empowering execution offices to
directly enforce certain debts;180 a vigorous – bordering
on aggressive – promotion of alternative dispute resolu-
tion, especially mediation, in order to induce parties to
settle without trial;181 as well as, last but not least, the
adoption by the courts of a philosophy putting greater
emphasis on the allocation of limited judicial resources
based on the importance of the case (with the monetary
amount involved usually serving as proxy).182 The latter
rationale – which also implies a partial departure from
the former approach putting truth discovery above oth-
er considerations183 – lies at the heart of an organisation-
al reform introduced in 2001-2002, in parallel with the
adoption of the fast track procedure, establishing a new
system of case management. The reform – which was
inspired, similarly to the fast track, by the English mod-
el adopted in 1998184 – authorized the creation of case
allocation (literally ‘file routing’) departments (mahlakot
176. See Agmon-Gonen, above n. 153, at 220-33. On the importance of
‘legitimacy’ of judicial decisions, see also Lempert, above n. 175, at
1651.
177. In 2003, the case backlog stood at 515, 345; see State of Israel, Courts
Administration, Ma’arekhet Batei Mishpat be-Yisra’el – Du’a”h Hatsi
Shnati: 1.1.08-30.06.08 [The Court System in Israel – Half-Yearly
Report: 1.1.08-30.06.08] (August 2008), at 4 (in Hebrew), available at:
<http:// elyon1. court. gov. il/ heb/ haba/ dochot/ doc/ 1 -6_ 2008. pdf>. By
the end of 2013, it decreased to 440,850 cases; see Yearly Report
2013, above n. 33, at 9. Since 2010, the balance of closed versus newly
opened cases has been consistently positive. See State of Israel, Courts
Administration, Ma’arekhet Batei Mishpat be-Yisra’el – Du’a”h Hatsi
Shnati: 1.7.2011-31.12.2011 [The Court System in Israel – Half-Yearly
Report: 1.7.2011-31.12.2011] (January 2012), at 6-7 (in Hebrew),
available at: <http:// elyon1. court. gov. il/ heb/ haba/ dochot/ doc/ 7 -12_
2011. pdf>; State of Israel, Courts Administration, Ha-Reshut ha-Shofe-
tet be-Yisra’el: Du’a”h Shnati 2012 [The Judicial Authority in Israel:
Yearly Report 2012] (2013), at 9 (in Hebrew), available at: <http://
elyon1. court. gov. il/ heb/ haba/ dochot/ doc/ second2012. pdf>; Yearly
Report 2013, above n. 33, at 9.
178. See above, Section 3.3.
179. See above n. 83, and the accompanying text.
180. See above, notes 101-3, and the accompanying text.
181. See generally E. Finkelstein, ‘Aliyat Ma’amado shel Halikh ha-Gishur ve-
ha-She’ela ha-Hukatit’ [The Rise of the Mediation Procedure and the
Constitutional Question’], 8 Kiryat ha-Mishpat 403 (2009) (in Hebrew).
In order to facilitate mediation, an amendment to the RCP, adopted in
2008, introduced an obligatory ‘mediation meeting’ between the par-
ties in the pre-trial stage (though this has only been applied in select
courts). See RCP, Rules 99A-99K; Goldstein et al., above n. 19, at 23-5.
182. See e.g. LCA 8126/13 Kashdi v. State of Israel, para. 6 (26 January
2014), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (per Z. Zilbertal J). For a
scathing criticism of this philosophy, in the context of the fast track pro-
cedure, see Shilo, above n. 153, at 341-5.
183. See above, Section 2.1.
184. See Goldstein (2011), above n. 170, at 28.
le-nituv tikkim) in all courts.185 Although many aspects
of the new departments are yet to be implemented in
full, their goals have been clearly formulated. They
include, inter alia, sorting, classification, and evaluation
of cases in order to ensure that judicial time is devoted,
as far as possible, only to issues requiring judicial discre-
tion; allocation of files to a suitable track, with the aim
to optimize their treatment; making preliminary
approaches to parties in order to ensure honest and
expeditious proceedings and, in appropriate cases, to
receive their consent to referring the case to alternative
dispute resolution proceedings; creation and operation
of follow-up and oversight procedures over the treat-
ment of cases in courts; advising the parties who are not
represented by counsel so as to assure equal access to
courts and save costs.186 Evident from these and accom-
panying provisions187 is the intention to take over the
management of proceedings, and especially of pre-trial
proceedings, from the parties and their attorneys and to
transfer it to the court.188 This reflects a much more
profound shift in the philosophical underpinnings of the
Israeli civil procedure: from a traditional ‘litigatory’
model to one of ‘case management’, where efficiency
and economy considerations reign supreme.189 And
indeed, while the Supreme Court once remarked that at
least one of the aims of the new case allocation system is
to bridge the power and resources gap between the liti-
gants,190 the main reason for its creation is to save public
costs and to alleviate the caseload burden on the courts.
One would assume that the motivation to adopt cost-
cutting measures – including those in the field of civil
procedure – should be at its highest in times of econom-
ic distress and would tend to weaken in times of pros-
perity. Israeli realities do seem to conform to this almost
intuitive supposition. Prima facie, a fairly straightfor-
ward link between austerity and rolling (or scaling) back
the truth discovery mission of the courts, in order to
promote simplicity and finality, can be established. It is
indeed especially prominent in the sphere of simplified
procedures. In fact, some of the more far-reaching
reforms (creation of the fast track and the new case allo-
cation mechanism, as well as the widening of the execu-
tion offices’ powers of debt collection)191 were adopted
at the time of a deep recession – bringing about in its
wake harsh, across-the-board austerity cuts – traversed
185. Courts Law, Section 82A. So far, the departments have been establish-
ed in the Magistrates’ Courts only. See Goldstein et al., above n. 19, at
114.
186. Court Regulations (File Routing Departments in General and Labor
Courts), 5762-2002, KT 6189, at 1198, at Section 3 [hereinafter: Court
Regulations (File Routing Departments)]. See also Goldstein et al.,
above n. 19, at 114-5.
187. Relating to the appointment of a ‘control centre judge’ and a ‘legal sec-
retary’, who are to be put in charge of running the department. See
Court Regulations (File Routing Departments), Sections 4, 5.
188. See Goldstein (2011), above n. 170, at 29-30.
189. On the emergence of the ‘case management’ system in Israel’s civil pro-
cedure, see Schwartz, above n. 21, at 40-6. See also Goldstein (2011),
above n. 170, at 33.
190. Assurances générales de France, 60(3) PD, at 253.
191. See above notes 102, 136, 185, and the accompanying text.
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by Israel in the years 2001-2003.192 Additional meas-
ures, such as raising the bar of small and fast track
claims, coincided with the onset of the global financial
crisis in 2008.193 Then, despite initial worries, the Israeli
economy managed to cope with the consequences of the
crisis quite well and emerged from it with only minimal
damage.194 The relatively good economic situation, cou-
pled with a moderate reduction of the case backlog,
seem to have cooled the reformist élan somewhat. Thus,
the 2008 Ronen Report recommendation to raise the bar
of fast track claims to NIS 100,000195 has not been
implemented, and other cost-saving procedural reforms
have been eventually abandoned.196
The pattern described above looks too consistent to be a
mere coincidence. And yet, despite the apparent con-
nection between the state of the Israeli economy and the
incidence of procedural reform, some caveats are in
order. First, the pattern is seemingly broken by the 2015
amendment increasing the maximum sum of claims
amenable to the ‘direct execution’ track,197 which was
legislated not during a period of crisis, but rather of sta-
ble, albeit reduced, economic growth198 (one should
bear in mind, however, the rather limited scope of the
change introduced).199 Second, the straightforward
rhetoric of (budgetary) austerity is virtually absent from
the available published legislative debates on the adop-
ted amendments. The terms used and the themes refer-
red to are ‘economy’, ‘efficiency’,200 as well as reducing
192. See above n. 8, and the accompanying text.
193. See above notes 83, 137, and the accompanying text.
194. See above n. 5, and the accompanying text.
195. See above n. 154.
196. See Shetreet, above n. 35, at 624-5.
197. See above n. 102, and the accompanying text.
198. See above n. 6.
199. Raising the bar from NIS 50,000 to NIS 75,000 would enable the trans-
fer of about 6,000 claims from the courts to the Execution Offices (out
of over 700,000 cases filed yearly). See The Knesset, Constitution, Law
and Justice Committee, Protocol no. 20, above n. 115. It should be
noted that the 2015 amendment also dealt with the technical aspects of
improving notice on the debtor. See Id.; Execution Law Bill (Amend-
ment No. 46), above n. 132. The amendment was voted unanimously
both in the Committee and in the Knesset plenum; on the vote, see the
Knesset website at: <http:// main. knesset. gov. il/ Activity/ Legislation/
Laws/ Pages/ LawSecondary. aspx ?lawitemid= 566316>.
200. See e.g. the explanatory notes to the 2002 Execution Law Bill (Amend-
ment No. 25), above n. 121, introducing the ‘direct execution’ track
(the proposal’s goal is ‘to advance economy and efficiency’), and the
Committee debate on this measure, see The Knesset, Constitution, Law
and Justice Committee, Protocol no. 429, above n. 115 (Committee
Chairmen O. Pines-Paz stressing that the amendment would ‘save the
Government’s expenses’). See also the debates on increasing the upper
limit of small claims, The Knesset, Constitution, Law and Justice Com-
mittee, Protocol no. 598, above n. 84 (highlighting the proposal’s con-
tribution to reducing costs) and of claims in the ‘direct execution’ track,
The Knesset, Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, Protocol no. 20,
above n. 115 (‘efficiency’ mentioned among the proposed rationales of
the proposed change). The ‘economy of time and resources’, both to
the parties to the litigation and to the court system, is prominently fea-
tured in the explanatory notes (by the Israeli Ministry of Justice) to the
draft introducing the fast track procedure to the RCP in 2001; published
in Cohen and Klein, above n. 136, Appendix B, at 64.
the caseload burden.201 Third, and probably most
importantly, it is evident that the reforms introduced in
times of economic difficulty – especially the more radi-
cal ones – require lengthy preparatory work which does
not temporarily overlap with (cyclic) economic down-
turns. Such is prominently the case of the 2001 amend-
ment to the RCP creating the fast track, which closely
follows the 1998 ‘Woolf Reform’ in England, but has
even earlier local precursors.202
In light of the above qualifications, what is left, if at all,
of the purported link between ‘austerity’ and the meas-
ures to simplify Israel’s civil procedure? An argument
can be made that the link still exists, although it is of a
more indirect and less mechanical nature. In this con-
text, economic woes can be seen as creating a general
atmosphere propitious to actually go through with
reforms which might have fizzled out (or would have
been postponed) in a climate of relative prosperity.
‘Austerity’, thus, becomes both an impetus and an ideo-
logical ‘cover’ for procedural simplification, which
influences all the relevant parties: the reform’s stake-
holders, the legislators, and the general public.203 As the
atmosphere created by economic crisis dissipates, on the
other hand, the impetus and the ideology’s hold over
hearts and minds weaken, and contrary considerations
come to the fore. While this general thesis certainly
requires additional research based on substantial empiri-
cal evidence may be required (not least as to its precise
scope), it can be buttressed somewhat by the recent –
and ongoing – Israeli experience with the far-reaching
proposal to simplify civil procedure incarnated in the
new Draft Rules of Civil Procedure. The salient provi-
sions of the Draft and the debate over it are sketched out
below.
4.2 A New Beginning or a Dead End? The 2014
Draft Rules of Civil Procedure
In the last days of 2014, the Draft Rules, drawn up by a
team headed by the former Courts Administrator, Judge
(ret.) Moshe Gal, were published by the Israeli Justice
Ministry. The Draft’s aspirations are far-reaching: it
purports to replace the currently valid 1984 RCP with a
modernized and ‘user-friendly’ civil procedure code.
The radicality of the proposed reform is evident in the
drastic slimming down of the black-letter substance –
from over 700 rules in the current version of the RCP to
just 176.204 This fact alone shows that the Draft’s core
aim is that of overall simplification and streamlining of
civil procedure in Israel. While a detailed analysis of
201. See in this vein e.g. The Knesset, Constitution, Law and Justice Commit-
tee, Protocol no. 429, above n. 115; The Knesset, Constitution, Law
and Justice Committee, Protocol no. 598, above n. 84; The Knesset,
Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, Protocol no. 20, above n.
115.
202. See above, Section 3.3. On the historical and preparative background of
the 2001 reform in Israel, dating back to the mid-1990s and even to the
late 1980s, see Cohen and Klein, above n. 136, at 7-9, 64-6.
203. On the ‘ideology of austerity’, see generally M. Blyth, ‘Austerity as
Ideology: A Reply to My Critics’, 11 Comparative European Politics 737
(2013).
204. Draft Rules, above n. 30, at 2.
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specific substantive provisions of the Draft Rules is out-
side the scope of this article, it is clear that their main
thrust is to unify all proceedings largely ‘under one
roof’.205 Even though the proposed unification is incom-
plete (the small claims are unaffected, summary proce-
dure survives in part, and the fast track is retained in
principle),206 the effect of the reform on both ‘regular’
and simplified procedures is easily discernible: the two
are being ‘merged’, with the ‘standard’ civil procedure
now looking more like a ‘simplified’ one itself. This
‘submerging’ of the simplified procedures by ‘regular’
procedure, while certainly not rendering the former
(completely) redundant, does significantly reduce their
prominence.
What is even more important, however, is the Draft’s
underlying philosophy. It marks a departure from the
formerly prevalent approach of procedural flexibility
towards more rigidity.207 It seals the process of transfor-
mation of the Israeli system from (an originally adversa-
rial, later more inquisitorial) ‘procedure’ into ‘case man-
agement’, focused on ‘efficiency’.208 As a matter of fact,
although the goals of ‘efficiency’ and ‘swift justice’ are
not included in the Draft Rules themselves (which only
specifically refer, in the introductory chapter devoted to
‘Basic Principles’, to ‘resolution [of disputes] within a
reasonable time’),209 they are peppered through the
Draft’s explanatory notes.210 In the end result, the deli-
cate pre-existing balance between ‘economy’ (meaning,
in this context, a speedy resolution of cases) and ‘quali-
ty’ (meaning a thorough investigation of the evidence
and of the parties’ arguments)211 is tilted drastically in
the Draft in favour of ‘economy’.212 Given all this, it is
not a major exaggeration to say that the Draft Rules, if
adopted, would represent a paradigmatic, almost tecton-
ic shift in Israeli civil procedure law.
The elaboration of the Draft Rules occurred completely
under the radar, and their publication was not preceded
205. Id. See also Taussig and Kleiman, above n. 131, Parts A, C.1.
206. See above, the text accompanying notes 84, at 125-7, 150-1.
207. The Draft puts great emphasis on enforcing the prescribed delays as
well as on reducing the scope of the parties’ written pleadings; viola-
tions are to be sanctioned administratively by the court’s ‘legal secreta-
ry’ who is authorised to deny the filing of documents. See Draft Rules,
above n. 30, at 2-3; Rule 35. Moreover, the Draft introduces (in its Part
B, Chapter B), the ‘Pre-Action Protocol’, imposing rather burdensome
obligations on the claimants prior to initiating the proceedings; these
obligations create significant ‘sunk costs’. See Id., at 3; I. Rosen-Zvi,
‘Reforma Meyuteret u-Mezika’ [‘A Superfluous and Harmful Reform’],
28 Orekh ha-Din 68, 71 (2015) (in Hebrew). On the tendency of the
Israeli jurisprudence towards a flexible interpretation of procedural rules,
see above, Section 2.1.
208. See Schwartz, above n. 21, at 40-6.
209. Draft Rules, Rule 2.
210. See Draft Rules, above n. 30, at 1, 2, 4, 9, 11.
211. According to the terminology coined by Adrian Zuckerman; see A.A.S.
Zuckerman, ‘Quality and Economy in Civil Procedure: The Case for
Commuting Correct Judgments for Timely Judgments’, 14 Oxford Jour-
nal of Legal Studies 353 (1994). See also Shetreet, above n. 35, at
623-4 (describing the tension between ‘efficiency’ and ‘fair process’ as
inherent in the administration of justice).
212. See Orenstein and Efron, above n. 135, Part D.
by public debate.213 The reactions to the Draft from
both the academic and the practicing lawyer community
have been predominantly negative;214 in fact, it seems
the only active support for the Draft Rules has come
from the ‘Gal team’ members themselves.215 The criti-
cisms levelled against the Draft are varied,216 but behind
most of them one general concern can easily be identi-
fied: that the proposed reform goes way too far in its
simplification and homogenisation drive.217 The gener-
al, overriding criticism points out to the limits of
(over-)simplification: the Draft is based on a (naïve)
assumption that ‘simple rules will turn the reality into a
simple one’;218 however, when ‘simple’ rules come into
contact with a complex reality, elaborate interpretative
adjustments are inevitably required.219 The reform is
thus liable to generate more problems than it purports
to solve, while upsetting the balancing act between the
various goals and values of civil procedure, created and
maintained by the legislator and the courts over the
years.220 Ultimately, and to use Adrian Zuckerman’s
terminology, the Draft Rules, instead of ‘rationing pro-
cedure’, end up rationing access to justice.221 Rather
unsurprisingly, this attack on the simplification drive of
the Draft Rules is aided by recent criticisms of the ach-
ievements of the Woolf reform.222
In light of the above, what does the future hold in store
for the Draft Rules? According to a Talmudic saying,
213. See I. Baum, ‘Kakh Tira’e ha-Reforma she-Teshane et Kol ha-Tvi’ot ha-
Ezrahiyot be-Yisra’el’ [‘This Is What the Reform That Will Change All
Civil Proceedings in Israel Will Look Like’], The Marker, 26 November
2014, available at: <www. themarker. com/ law/ 1. 2495731> (in
Hebrew).
214. See Rosen-Zvi, above n. 207; R. Liba, ‘Hahlafat Takanot Seder ha-Din
ha-Ezrahi me-ha-Yesod Alula Ligrom Davka le-Omes’ [‘Completely
Replacing the Rules of Civil Procedure Is Liable to Cause More Burden’]
Globes, 26 January 2015, available at: <www. globes. co. il/ news/ article.
aspx ?did= 1001003736> (in Hebrew); I. Baum, ‘Ha-Hatsa’a le-Reforma
be-Takanot Seder ha-Din ha-Ezrahi Haya ve-Sofeget Be’itot’ [‘The Pro-
posed Reform of the Rules of Civil Procedure Is Alive and Getting
Kicked’], The Marker, 13 April 2015, available at: <www. themarker.
com/ law/ 1. 2612179> (in Hebrew); S. Kalfon, ‘Lishkat Oha’d Yotset
Neged ha-Reforma be-Takanot Seder ha-Din ha-Ezrahi’ [‘The Bar Asso-
ciation Comes out Against the Reform of the Civil Procedure Rules’],
Globes, 15 July 2015, available at: <www. globes. co. il/ news/ article.
aspx ?did= 1001053287> (in Hebrew).
215. See Baum, above n. 214.
216. One specific criticism concerns the (partial) abolition of existing special
and/or simplified tracks (such as the summary procedure). It is argued
that these are, in reality, considerably more successful than the standard
procedure in achieving the goal of ‘speedy justice’. See above notes
130-131, and the accompanying text.
217. See, among others, Orenstein and Efron, above n. 141, Part E; Taussig
and Kleiman, above n. 131, Parts A, F.
218. Rosen-Zvi, above n. 207, at 70.
219. Id.
220. See Liba, above n. 214; Baum, above n. 214; Rosen-Zvi, above n. 207,
at 69-70.
221. See Baum, above n. 214; Kalfon, above n. 214; Rosen-Zvi, above n.
207, at 71. On the concept of ‘rationing procedure’, see A.A.S. Zucker-
man, ‘A Reform of Civil Procedure: Rationing Procedure Rather Than
Access to Justice’, 22 Journal of Law and Society 155 (1995).
222. See e.g. H. Genn, ‘What Is Civil Justice For? Reform, ADR and Access to
Justice’, 24 Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities 397 (2013). Pro-
fessor Genn was one of the speakers at the Tel-Aviv University confer-
ence where the 2014 Draft was severely criticised. See Baum, above n.
214.
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prophecy has been given to fools and children;223 this is
all the more true with regard to pending (secondary)
legislation. Nevertheless, drawing on past Israeli experi-
ence, the current juncture does not look particularly
propitious for a major break with the accepted status
quo (which has remained unchanged in its foundations
since the time of the British Mandate in the 1930s, and
has only been tampered with in a piecemeal fashion and
rather sparingly). The recent procedural reforms sacri-
ficing ‘quality’ on the altar of ‘efficiency’ (which, as
shown, have mostly coincided with periods of economic
downturn), were either mostly uncontroversial (as in the
case of the changes concerning the small claims and the
summary tracks)224 or faced only limited and brief criti-
cism (as in the case of the fast track procedure).225 The
determined opposition encountered by the new Draft is
of a totally different nature. It shows that, notwithstand-
ing the continuing dissatisfaction with the justice sys-
tem’s performance, and especially with its slowness, the
force of cost-saving ‘efficiency’ arguments has weakened
considerably;226 and that a crisis mentality favouring
drastic reform is largely absent both in the legal profes-
sion and among the political decision-makers. It is thus
understandable that one of the chief criticisms raised
against the reform put forward in the Draft Rules is that
it is ‘superfluous’.227 This ‘don’t fix it if it isn’t broken’
logic seems to be carrying the day at this point.228 Time
will tell whether this conservative attitude will continue
to prevail in the middle term.
5 Concluding Remarks
The recent global financial and economic crisis has
highlighted that civil procedure is not exempt from aus-
terity considerations. Although the last crisis barely
made a dent in the Israeli economy, concerns over the
perceived inefficiency of the existing civil procedure
have dominated the Israeli public debate for years.
These concerns centre largely on the excessive length of
proceedings; ‘slow justice’ with its attendant inefficien-
cies and potential injustices (which are exacerbated by
high litigation costs) is widely perceived as the bane of
the current system. Over the years, various simplified
procedures have been created and developed by the leg-
islator for certain types of claims, providing alternatives
– and complements – to the regular track. These proce-
dures, overviewed in detail in the present article, have
223. Babylonian Talmud, Baba Bathra, 12b.
224. See above, Sections 3.1 and 3.2.
225. See above, notes 153-154, and the accompanying text.
226. For Israel’s above-average economic performance during the last few
years, see above notes 5 and 6, and the accompanying text.
227. See the title of the article by Rosen-Zvi, above n. 207.
228. An additional factor potentially influencing the Draft’s future prospects
is that two key supporters of civil procedure reform have left their posi-
tions: Justice Minister Tsipi Livni (who was dismissed from the Govern-
ment in 2013) and Chief Justice Asher Grunis (who retired in early
2015). See Baum, above n. 214. The position of the current Justice
Minister, Ayelet Shaked, who represents a different political party and
holds pronouncedly anti-activist views, is not (yet) publicly known.
served an invaluable role in alleviating the overall litiga-
tion burden of Israeli courts. They also seem to have
successfully charted the middle ground between the two
opposing poles: one of ‘economy’, concerning itself with
the limited resources of the justice system and the need
for speedy and final resolution of disputes, and the other
one, that of ‘quality’, emphasising the courts’ primary
mission of truth discovery as a pre-requisite to arriving
at a ‘just’ solution.
Some measure of the success of simplified procedures in
Israel can be seen in the substantial widening of their
scope in the years 2000, with little or no opposition.
This enlargement of the simplified procedures’ relative
weight within the Israeli system (including the creation
of a new ‘fast track’ for low-value claims) was mostly
greeted with approval on the part of both the members
of the legal profession and the general public. However,
the ball did not stop there. In fact, the simplified proce-
dures’ accomplishments have carried over to the regular
procedure, and the policy makers appear to have come
close to being carried away by them. The recent reform
proposal by the Justice Ministry, embodied in the 2014
Draft Rules, represents a transfusion of norms and prin-
ciples derived from simplified procedures into the ‘stan-
dard’ civil procedure. As shown in the article, the Draft
blurs the boundaries between the ‘simplified’ and the
‘regular’ procedures to a great extent. Contrary to previ-
ous reforms, this blurring of the lines has elicited largely
negative reactions and even a sort of a backlash, putting
a question mark over the reform’s prospects both in the
short and the middle term.
The vigorous opposition to the proposed Draft Rules
symbolises the limits of the attempts to further simplify
civil procedure in the name of ‘efficiency’ and ‘speeding
up justice’, beyond lower-value and prima facie ‘simple’
claims. It also illustrates the connection between austeri-
ty and civil procedure reform: simplification of proce-
dure, sacrificing ‘quality’ on the altar of efficiency, are
accepted and even hailed by the public in times of real
or perceived crisis; with good economic performance,
concerns for assuring truth discovery – which requires a
comprehensive examination of evidence and the parties’
arguments – come to the fore. While more research on
the connection between austerity and civil procedure is
needed, the Israeli example does show that attempts to
tilt the balance toward (ever more) ‘efficiency’ in civil
procedure outside austerity/crisis situations are viewed
with suspicion, as unjustified endeavours to ‘cut cor-
ners’.
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